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FLIGHT TEST RESULTS OF THE STRAPDOWN


HEXAD INERTIAL REFERENCE UNIT (SIRU)


VOLUME II - TEST REPORT


Ames Research Center


SUMMARY


A flight test program was conducted under sponsorship of NASA-Ames


Research Center to evaluate the performance of the redundant, modularized,


fault-tolerant Strapdown Inertial Reference Unit (SIRU) in a short-haul air­

craft environment. The SIRU system tested was originally developed as an


advanced navigation system for post-Apollo programs. The principal flight


test objectives included assessment of:


1. SIRU performance as an unaided inertial navigation system.


2. Capability of the system redundancy management software to detect


sensor failures.


3. Flight performance of the SIRU dual-computer configuration


The results of 15 separate flights showed that during cruise the error 

growth was less than 3 n. mi./hr. During terminal area maneuvers, the errors 

were less than 5 n. mi./hr Additional analysis, design, and testing would 

reduce these errors. Updating the inertial data with Distance Measuring 

Equipment (DEE) readings would enable the SIRU system to provide a position 

accuracy better than 0.2 n. mii. 
During the flight tests, no gyro failures smaller than 1.50 /hr were


detected because the SIRU software detection threshold was adjusted upward to


prevent excessive false alarms. These levels were approximately twenty times


larger than gyro drift detected in the laboratory. Thus, the SIRU software


could detect and isolate only those gyro failures that were "hard failures"


from a navigation point of view. The isolatable failures are "soft failures"


from the point of view of flight control applications. The fault detection


and isolation algorithms require more research for the overall SIRU concepts


to be acceptable for operational aircraft use.


The SIRU dual-computer system provided both reliable and correct informa­

tion. However, several design improvements were suggested to improve the


overall reliability and maintainability of a future system.


INTRODUCTION


The performance goals for economically viable short-haul aircraft require


sophisticated powered-lift and aerodynamic high-lift devices to increase pay­

loads and reduce takeoff and landing distances The application of these
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high-lift devices, coupled with increasingly complicated power-control and


vehicle-control techniques, has produced:


1. A proliferation of control sensors, actuators and display devices for


stabilizing and flying the aircraft in its various flight modes.


2. Steep, curved, and time-constrained precision flight paths that


require redundant high-performance, high-reliability navigation and guidance


systems.


The net effect is that short-haul aircraft carry many electronic devices


and sensors that, though similar in function, service different subsystems.


Because these devices are generally built by different manufacturers, the


costs of procuring, developing, integrating, and maintaining the navigation,


guidance, and control subsystems are compounded.


Current avionics systems use numerous sensors, actuators, and display


devices. These systems often overlap in function, thereby providing a limited


degree of redundancy in control and navigation reliability. Redundancy, when


it exists at all, exists most often in the form of hardware duplication. For


example, reliability of commercial aircraft inertial navigation has been


obtained by having identical triplicate Inertial Navigation Systems (INS).


More cost-effective approaches, other than use of multiple individual


avionics hardware units, are available for improving avionics system reliabil­

ity. Cost studies (ref. 1) show a significant potential for improvement in


both reliability and cost if integrated avionics concepts were based on strap­

down technology. These concepts use the inherent redundancy of the strapdown


guidance, navigation and control sensors, advances in sensors and semiconduc­

tor technology, and advances in redundant avionics algorithms. They also use


the computer to identify faults and to aid in removing failed sensors by soft­

ware reconfiguration. This integrated approach eliminates unnecessarily


redundant hardware. The SITU is such a system.


The SIRU system is an experimental, integrated, modularized, fault­

tolerant avionics system originally developed for space applications by the


Charles Stark Draper Laboratory under contract NAS9-8242 with NASA Johnson


Space Center. The original mechanization was augmented under contract


NAS2-7439 with NASA-Ames Research Center to install a flightworthy, redundant
 

navigation system in the NASA Convair 340 (CV-340) aircraft. The SIRU flight


test program was undertaken by NASA/Ames to evaluate SIRU in an aircraft


flight environment. The primary goal of the SIRU flight test program was to


develop a performance baseline of an integrated guidance, navigation, and


flight control system for short-haul aircraft.


The SIRU flight test system is a free-inertial (unaided, dead-reckoning)


navigation system consisting of a strapdown hexad inertial sensor array


(fig. 1) and dual Honeywell H316 computers with a digital tape recorder


(fig. 2). The sensors consist of six single-degree-of-freedom integrating


gyros and six linear accelerometers. The six sensing axes of the inertial


sensor array lie along the normals to six nonparallel faces of a dodecahedron.
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Each axis contains one integrating rate gyro module (IRIG 18 Model B) and one


linear accelerometer module (16PM PIP MOD B). The symmetric dodecahedral


sensing axis orientation is depicted in figure 3.


The SIRU dodecahedral sensor configuration and the redundancy management


software permit the navigation system to function when any three gyros and any


three accelerometers are operational. When sensor failures are detected and


the faulty sensor identified (isolated), outputs of the faulty sensors are


excluded by system software from the computation of position, velocity, and


attitude. The system continues to function with the remaining sensors.


The SIRU system includes prealigned, normalized, interchangeable assem­

blies in which each instrument is integrated with its own torque loop and


temperature controller. The remaining electronics are located in interchange­

able modules, by axis, in the electronics assembly section. The modular fea­

ture- facilitates system maintenance repair and replacement of line units.


SIRU was continuously exercised in a laboratory environment from July


1970 through July 1974, prior to the adaptation of the SIRU instrument package


for flight tests Fifteen flight tests of the SIRU system were made in NASA's


CV-340 aircraft between May 20, 1975 and September 24, 1975. The flight test


system had a digital data tape recorder and individual plasma information


displays. The installation of SIRU in the CV-340 is illustrated in figure 4.


To assess SIRU's navigational performance, the flight test program used


several aircraft position references. In addition to the two Nike-Hercules


tracking radars at the Ames Research Center Crows Landing Naval Auxiliary


Landing Field test facility, the test program used (a) multiple station DNE


range data from a digitally tuned DME receiver, (b) optical waypoint position


fixes taken on landmarks with a driftmeter and recorded by camera, and


(c) surveyed position benchmarks (latitude and longitude) used as external


references. Barometric and radar altitude were also measured and recorded in


flight. During SIRU's free-inertial navigation computations, the position


references at Moffett Field and Crows Landing were used for initialization


only.


This report, Volume II, is a compilation of the flight test and labora­

tory objectives, procedures, and results It is organized as follows:


1. The next section defines the specific flight test objectives in more


detail. These include investigations of the inertial navigation accuracy,


failure detection and isolation algorithm, and the dual-computer mechanization.


2. The third section describes the flight test program including (a) the


flight plan, (b) the reference position measurement system, (c) the SIRU


operational procedures, and (d) the data analysis algorithms.


3. The fourth section presents a summary of individual flight test


results, the flight test assessment of the SIRU navigation and failure detec­

tion and isolation capability, and apparent system limitations.
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4. The fifth section presents results from a laboratory evaluation of


the SIRU dual-computer system.


5. The final section summarizes the flight test program and makes recom­

mendations concerning future research and applications.


Volume III of the flight test report consists of seven appendixes which


provide technical-details that support the material included in this volume.


FLIGHT TEST OBJECTIVES


The broad goal of the SIRU flight test program was to continue the inves­

tigation of the application of strapdown inertial technology and redundancy


management techniques with the objective of achieving a low-cost, highly


reliable, integrated flight avionics system for short-haul air transportation.


This goal was to be attained by flight testing the SIRU system in the NASA-

Ames Convair 340 (CV-340) aircraft and by making additional laboratory


investigations.


The principal flight test objectives included assessment of:


1. SIRU's performance as a skewed-sensor-free-inertial navigation system.


2. The system's ability to detect and isolate sensor failures with


redundancy management software.


3. The performance of the SIRU system's redundant parallel dual computer


configuration and its compatibility with the hexad sensor redundancy


arrangement.


The flight test results were examined with specialized post-flight software


(refs. 2 and 3) to assess the SIRU system's performance.


Inertial Navigation Accuracy


Inertial sensors can be used for smoothing (low-frequency filtering) of


radio guidance and navigation signals on short-haul flights. These signals


may be smoothed by using aircraft attitude reference sensors (vertical


gyro, directional gyro), body-mounted rate sensors, and body-mounted acceler­

ometers. The SIRU system concept has the potential of replacing all the above


sensors with derived outputs from its inertial grade sensors, and of providing


both guidance and navigation smoothing and free-inertial navigation (which is


not available from the standard sensor set).


As the only inertial sensor system aboard the aircraft, SIRU would per­

form four essential functions:
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1. Inertial sensing for flight control


2. Inertial sensing for radio guidance data (such as ILS) smoothing


3. Inertial smoothing to complement radio navigation data


4. Dead-reckoning, free-inertial navigation


Tasks 1 and 2 are flight-critical and require redundant fail-operational


capability.


For short-haul aircraft operations, free-inertial navigation can provide


the following services, which are useful but usually not available:
 

1. Short-term area navigation in the case of radio failure


2. Great circle route navigation, which replaces supplementary electronic


systems needed with radio navigation


3. Missed-approach guidance backup in the terminal area under instrument
 

flight rules


4. Wind shear and gust monitoring (this may become a flight-critical


requirement, but presently is not)


5. Primary navigation in the absence of radio aids


The navigation performance requirement for these services is generally


accepted to be position error growth of less than 1-3 n. mi./hr for all air­

craft operation maneuvers, including errors resulting from operation of the


algorithms.


The SIRU system was the first hexad free-inertial navigator to be eval­

uated in flight for the above functions. The purpose of the skewed sensor


geometry was to provide optimum redundancy management and fail-operational


capability. A principal flight test objective was to demonstrate that this


skewed sensor geometry could provide free-inertial navigation performance


comparable with typical orthogonal sensor geometry.
 

In skewed sensor geometry, sensor outputs are combined to form a set of


three orthogonal outputs, which are used in navigation. While cross-coupling


of sensor output is required with nominally orthogonal geometries to account


for known sensor misalignments and nonparallel coordinate frames, the amount


of cross-coupling required is greater with skewed geometries. This large


dependency upon combining sensor outputs could conceivably amplify the dele­

terious effects of misalignment, measurement quantization, modeling, and com­

pensation errors on navigational performance. The hope was that advantages of


the redundant-sensor aspect of SIRU would balance out any possible negative


skewed-geometry aspects. In fact, the concept of using multiple redundant


skewed sensors could conceivably provide better performance than an orthogonal


triad sensor configuration with comparable sensors (ref. 4). Thus, the objec­

tive of evaluating navigational accuracy was partially directed at making this


evaluation.


Extra attention to the software was required because information from six


skewed redundant sensors had to be combined to render the orthogonal measures.


The increased complexity of the skewed, redundant system increased the likeli­

hood of software mistakes and dictated greater sophistication and care in


5


programming. The flight test program was also designed to prove that such


problems associated with skewed sensor geometries need not degrade navigational


performance.


The SIRU concept was originally designed to meet the operational, elec­

trical, mechanical, environmental, and mission interface requirements of the


Apollo spacecraft. Some of these requirements were distinctly different than


those for operation in a propeller-driven aircraft, such as the CV-340. These


differences are compared in table 1. The many physical differences from the


original design-operating environment could affect the flight test outcome in


both navigation accuracy and failure-detection performance.


The following points associated with navigation accuracy considerations


were to be measured or assessed:


1. Improvement in navigation performance (if any) through the utiliza­

tion of six sensors for measuring three orthogonal components (angular rate or


specific force).


2. The adequacy of the calibration and alignment techniques developed


for SIRU, and the identification of needed calibration and alignment


improvements.


The flight test program data were analyzed to address these points.


SIRU Failure Detection and Isolation Algorithm Performance


One primary goal of the SIRU project was to advance the state of the art


in redundancy management algorithms. Therefore, the second principal flight


test objective was the evaluation of the SIRU computer algorithms that detect


and isolate (remove) failed instruments (failure detection and isolation).


For operational utilization, these algorithms must function without causing a


serious degradation to the inertial navigation performance, or without gener­

ating deleterious signals (false alarms) when the system is used for flight


control purposes.


Two types of failure detection and isolation algorithms were implemented


in the SIRU software. These are referred to as the total squared error algo­

rithm and the statistical failure detection, isolation, classification, and


recompensation algorithm


The total squared error algorithm operates on the compensated instrument


data to estimate the difference (error, 2a) between what one sensor axis


actually reads, A, and what that measurement is estimated to be, A, based on


the other five sensor measurements. Geometric details and the theory behind


this algorithm are found in refeience 5.


A fault is known to exist (detected) when the sum of the squares (total


squared error) of the six individual errors (EA - EF) exceeds a preselected


threshold, called the maximum allowable squared error. The fault is localized
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to a specific measurement axis (isolated) by examining the time history of


each individual error and finding the maximum. The maximum allowable squared
 

error threshold is set by examining the fault-free values of the total squared
 

error, including effects of quantization and environmental noise. A maximum


allowable squared error set too low causes false alarms, and too high a value


produces undetected failures.


The total squared error algorithm was the only one used for monitoring


the accelerometers because it could theoretically detect and isolate-those


accelerometer degradations that would cause appreciable navigation errors.


The total squared error algorithm was also used to monitor the gyros to detect


and isolate "hard" failures whose magnitudes theoretically exceeded 0.75°/hr.


The intent of the statistical failure detection, isolation, classification and


recompensation algorithm was to detect and isolate gyro failures from below
 

0.75°/hr down to approximately the environmental noise expected in the error


equations.


Additional functions of the statistical failure detection, isolation,


classification, and recompensation algorithm were to classify and calibrate


the gyro failure as a jump in bias, ramp in bias, noise variance increase, or


false alarm. The degraded sensor could then be reinstated for use by recom­

pensation. This algorithm is based on using a sequential probability ratio


test and is discussed fully in reference 6.


The fault isolation methods had two different constraints:
 

1. Simultaneous failures could not be isolated.


2. Failures of equal amplitude (the second occurring during the isolation


period of the first) could result in the loss of failure identification of


both sensors.


It was assumed that these two conditions would not occur operationally.


One specific subobjective of the failure detection and isolation algorithm


evaluation was to establish the failure detection time versus the failure level


for sequential failures in flight operating conditions Laboratory measure­

ments indicated that the failure detection and isolation algorithms had the


capability to detect, isolate, and recover from gyro drift failures as small


as 0.068/hr,'a value commensurate with the IRIG 18 MOD B gyro's random drift


Theoretical considerations showed that the time for detection and isolation


decreased as the failure level increased. During the flight tests, simulated


attitude rate failures were introduced into the navigation computer during
 

cruise conditions and terminal area maneuvers representative of short haul


aircraft. The lengths of time required to detect, isolate, and recover from


the simulated sensor failure were observed and recorded. This permitted a


comparison to be made between the actual failure detection time of the imple­

mented failure detection and isolation algorithms and laboratory performance.


Theoretical evaluation of the SIRU system showed that navigation perfor­

mance was degraded by the output of a failed sensor during the time interval


from inception of the failure to detection and isolation of the failure by the
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failure detection and nsolation? algorithms. After isolation of the failure,


the navigation performance continued to be degraded only by the attitude or


velocity error that developed during the detection interval. The second sub­

objective was to evaluate this degradation in navigation performance when


sensor failures were introduced. This is discussed further in volume III.


Aircraft are subject to small high-frequency oscillations that cannot be


measured exactly by a sampled-data system. Digital sampling of these oscilla­

tions may introduce errors into redundancy management and navigation and


attitude calculations. The third specific subobjective of the failure detec­

tion and isolation algorithm performance assessment was to evaluate the effects
 

of these digital sampling errors during aircraft operation.


The statistical failure detection, isolation, classification, and recom­

pensation algorithm was designed to supplement the deterministic total squared


error algorithm in order to improve the level of sensitivity for sensor fault


isolation and to provide an on-line recalibration capability. When a sensor


exhibited normal statistical characteristics but its scale factor or bias


deviated from the calibrated value, the statistical failure detection, isola­

tion, classification, and recompensation algorithm identified the sensor and


provided new compensation values of bias or scale factor. The fourth specific


subobjective in assessing failure detection and isolation algorithm perfor­

mance was to evaluate its usefulness in flight instrument recalibration for


aircraft operations.


Redundant Dual Computer Mechanization Assessment


The dual computer configuration selected for the flight test program pro­

vided redundancy compatible with the redundant SIRU hardware and software sys­

tems. Dual ruggedized Honeywell H316 computers were selected to provide this


capability. The H316 computer assembly language used for the flight test


implementation was compatible with all existing laboratory SIRU software,


negating the need for recoding. The ruggedized hardware design was


flightworthy.


The dual computers were mechanized to run in a "prime/backup" mode. The


prime data were used as the valid system output unless the prime channel showed


a failure or the test engineer forced a switchover. Each computer ran an iden­

tical software program, and the two computers were synchronizad by software


checkpoints where comparisons were made and go-ahead signals were issued.


Data were acquired by the computers from the SIRU multiplexer and the


airborne reference system. The data were then processed and output to the
 

redundancy management hardware. Selftest programs were run in parallel to the


normal processing, and the results were transmitted with the regular output


data for determination of the prime computer status by an arbiter. The


arbiter provided voting to switch automatically from the "prime designated"


to "back-up designated" computer.


The final principal objective of the flight test program was to evaluate


the performance of the dual, synchronized-with-arbiter, redundant SIRU
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computer system mechanization under operational aircraft conditions. This


objective included laboratory evaluation. Redundancy management of the two


computers by dual transfer boxes, dual receivers, and the arbiter is illus­

trated in figure 5.


Figure 6 shows the dual computer and digital tape recorder controk inter­

face box and arbiter control panel. The dual plasma displays are shown in


figure 2.


FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM DESCRIPTION


The flight test program was designed to evaluate navigation, redundancy


management and dual computer operation. It included both short (<1.5 hr) and


long (>3 hr) flight periods, straight and triangular segments, curved paths,


and conventional terminal area maneuvers. This chapter describes the SIRU


flight test program, including:


1 SIRU flight test plan


2. A description of the CV-340 aircraft position reference system


3. SIRU operational procedures used to prepare and operate the system


during the test period


4. Data analysis algorithms used to reduce and analyze the flight test


data using the Ames Research Center IBM-360 or CDC-7600 computer


Flight Test Plan


The SIRU flight test program began May 20, 1975 and ended on September 24,


1975. Several acceptance flights were made earlier at Hanscom Field, Massa­

chusetts. Acceptance test results are reported in reference 7. Ames


Research Center's tests began and ended at Moffett Field Crows Landing Naval


Auxiliary Landing Field was the central calibrated waypoint for every flight


test. All flights were made in California's San Joaqumn and Salinas Valleys.


The largest segmented course included waypoints at Sacramento, Modesto,


Salinas, Moffett Field, and Oakland. The most commonly flown path was from


Crows Landing, Modesto, to Castle Air Force Base, and back to Crows Landing.


Figure 7 shows the general areas used for flight test and the landmarks (way­

points) used for visual calibration of the reference system.


A total of 15 test flights were made, with 3 flights devoted entirely to


navigation performance. Cruise portions of the flights were of sufficient


length to record one or more complete Schuler periods. Early flights were


used for navigation, SIRU calibration, and system adjustments. Portions of


each flight were utilized for testing the failure detection and isolation


algorithms. During September, several test flights were made near Crows Land­

ing to provide performance data during turns and takeoff and landing maneuvers.


Most flights were made below 3048 m (10,000 ft). Flight tests which evaluated


terminal area maneuvers followed the flight profile illustrated in figure 8.


Flight tests made in late July, August, and early September included


cases where the two flight computers were operated independently from the same
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sensor outputs. During these flights, the dual computer system was used pri­

marily to evaluate the SIRU system's sensor redundancy management rather than


to test dual computer redundancy management.


Flight test patterns were of two types: enroute (Moffett Field-to-Crows


Landing or Crows Landing-to-Moffett Frield) and approach (in the general vicin­

ity of Crows Landing). Enroute patterns are illustrated in figure 9 (take off


from Moffett Field, turn to fly over the Moffett Field DWE for a tape-mark,


fly over the San Jose DME for a tape-mark (twice), fly over Lick Observatory


for a visual mark, then overfly the Crows Landing DME for several tape-marks


before landing). The same sequence in reverse order was used on returning to


Moffett Field


A typical flight sequence originating at Crows Landing is shown in


figure 10. In this flight, the CV-340 left Crows Landing, crossed the runway


at Stockton, turned southeast, proceeded to Castle Air Force Base, then flew


to Merced, and finally back to Crows Landing.


Aircraft Position Reference System


The continuous position system used during the SIRU flight tests to track


the CV-340 aircraft consisted of two primary references:


1. A modified Nike-Hercules radar tracking system located at Crows


Landing


2. A six-channel multiple DME receiver system, designed by Sierra


Research Corporation, mounted within the aircraft


The modified Nike-Hercules radar provided improved resolution through the


use of 19-bit range and angle digital shaft encoders. No atmospheric refrac­

tion correction was provided. A transponder aboard the CV-340 was used to


improve angle tracking.


The DME receiver system provided range information from up to six DME or


TACAN stations. The system utilized a fast-switching DME receiver which was


programmed to automatically switch through each of six selectable DME or TACAN


frequencies. Range lock-up time was 1 sec maximum and range output resolution


was 18.5 m (0.01 n. mi.). Output range information was tagged with station


frequency and receiver-clock time for identification.


Time-referenced photographs of airport reference benchmarks were also


taken from the CV-340 aircraft periodically throughout each flight to provide


a third basic waypoint reference. These waypoints are indicated in figure 7.


The photographs were taken from the aircraft by a camera mounted on a military


standard driftmeter installed in the underside of the aircraft fuselage. The


positions of the driftmeter and DME receiver system within the CV-340 are


illustrated in figure 11. The timepoint at which each photograph was taken was


recorded in the SIRU digital tape recorder in order to correlate with radar,


SIRU, and DME position data. The number of photographs per flight varied from


8 to 16, depending upon the length of flight. The driftmeter's level gyro was
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inoperable during most of the flight tests, causing uncertainty about the air­

craft's attitude. As an example of this uncertainty, a 0.50 vertical misalign­

ment of the camera at an altitude of 3050 m (1000 ft) introduces a position


error of 26.2 m (86 ft).


Figure 12 is a chart indicating the relative position of the DME stations,


radar system, and reference airports utilized during the flight tests A list


of the DME stations and their locations is printed in table 2. The range and


bearing of each station is given with respect to the TACAN's coordinates at


Crows Landing. The acquisition altitude given is the minimum altitude required


at Crows Landing in order to receive a signal from the DME station.


In order to provide accurate start and terminal area position fixes, the


United States Geological Survey was commissioned to obtain reference position


benchmarks and azimuth lines at both Moffett Field and Crows Landing The


benchmarks were located to within ±4.0 arcsec of position (standard deviation).


Tables 3a and 3b list the latitude, longitude, and elevation of the applicable


benchmarks surveyed for Moffett Field and Crows Landing, respectively.


Figures 13 and 14 present maps illustrating the location of the benchmarks


with respect to reference buildings and landmarks at Moffett Field and Crows


Landing, respectively.


Flight Test Operating Procedures


Because of limited calendar time available for the flight test portion of


the SIRU program, a concerted effort was made to record a large amount of data


during a variety of test flights. Each flight had raw and calibrated data


recorded with engines off, and up to 0.5 hr of raw and calibrated data


recorded with engines on prior to taxi and flight In this manner, a suffi­

cient amount of preflight data was recorded for preflight test calculation of


inertial sensor compensation values for use during flight The data also pro­

vided postflight confirmation of performance changes occurring during the test


period.


All the flight tests were generally conducted with the following ten


sequential events.


1. Equipment turnon and warmup using ground power with the CV-340 air­

craft located at ground benchmark (reference point) #A. Align aircraft posi­

tion with respect to benchmark prior to azimuth calibration.


2 Level SIRU mechanical platform and align SIRU azimuth using the


porro prism theodolite and the calibrated azimuth line.


3. Start aircraft engines and remain in position up to 0.5 hr.


4. Put SIRU in fine align.


5. When computed instrument errors have stabilized for bias calibration,


turn on digital tape recorder and shift to navigate mode.
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6. Commence taxi for takeoff, hold at Moffett Field runway warmup park­

ing area to confirm operate status


7. Fly from Moffett Field to Crows Landing. If temperatures on the


ground at Crows Landing are prohibitive to the continuous instrument operation


of SIRU, go to 9.


8. Land at Crows Landing and taxi to benchmark #iL. Put a tape-mark on


the tape at touchdown and at the end of straight-line deceleration The nose


wheel follows as closely as possible to the white line during all take-offs


and landings Continue recording for about 20 man. The tape will have


40-50 mmn of recorded data at this time. At this point a supplementary align­

ment may be performed if necessary. Continuous data tape recording is made.


Go to 10.


9. Initiate Crows Landing test flight pattern. Land afterwards if


environmental conditions permit and go to 8 Otherwise, go to 10.


10. Fly from Crows Landing to Moffett Field. Record data. Land and taxi
 

to benchmark #A. Continue to navigate and record for about 5 min after air­

craft motion has ceased.


In all navigation flight tests, a full sensor calibration was made prior


to flight. Sensor calibration procedures had the following sequential events:


1. The SIRU instrument package was turned on long enough beforehand to


remove transients and never turned off until the end of the entire calibration


and flight test sequence. The calibrated azmuth line was signed by theodo­

lite through a porro prism and the mechanical platform was bubble-leveled
 

before the start of the sequence.


2. SIRU was put in a calibration mode.


3. After approximately 30 min in one position, the SIRU package was
 

slowly and mechanically rotated to a new position.


4. Step 3 was repeated three more times for a total of five positions.


5. The H316 computer determined bias and g-sensitive elements and pre­

pared a paper tape for SIRU.


6. SIRU was reprogrammed for navigation, and a new calibration matrix


was entered via the paper tape.


7. The instrument package was not turned off before completion of flight


tests. Fine alignment for the test was begun.


Forced failures were introduced in most of the flights to test the


failure detection and isolation algorithms. However, if these forced failures


in any way compromised the ability to obtain recorded flight data, they were


abandoned. Complete recording of all raw data was a requirement for postflight
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reconstruction. About 1 hr of continuous data was recorded on one 1097 m


(3600 ft) magnetic tape when both computers were on. This limited the flight


time for tests when postflight reconstruction was desired. The allowed record­

ing duration doubled when only one computer's output was recorded.


The eight flight test data sources (peripherals) interfaced with the SIRU


system are depicted in figure 15. Readings from each peripheral were under


H316 program control and were normally checked every 25 msec (every SIRU data


input); that is, if new data were ready, they were read within a maximum of


25 msec.


Some of the peripherals (e.g., DME) may have had more than one input at a


single service. In this case the device was serviced until all data had been


read, which may have prevented other peripherals from being serviced. The


time code generator was updated every 2 sec. Data from the barometric altim­

eter and radar altimeters were updated every second.


Each receiver (of computer A or computer B), upon receipt of data to be


recorded, issued a request to have its data stored on tape. The request was


stored and presented to an eight-state sequencing operator. The operator


selected which request (A or B) was to be serviced first, and then generated


three enable pulses to the selected receiver. The data appeared on tape as


three bytes from one channel or the other, but did not necessarily alternate


from one to the other.


The arbiter examined the eight-bit diagnostic word on every output. It


searched for any failure conditions, displayed the status of the diagnostics,


and determined which system (A or B) should be prime. When a failure occurred,


it was indicated by the appropriate fail light and channel-fail indication


The channel-fail indication caused the computers to exchange prime status,


after which the prior status, for certain failures, could only be restored


manually.


Flight Test Data Processing


The SIRU Flight Test Program produced 46 magnetic tape reels of recorded


test data. Thirty-four of the reels were produced by the SIRU Navigation Sys­

tem, the other 12 by the radar tracking facility at Crows Landing. The SIRU


tapes contain recorded external reference data (DEE, altimeters, time code


generator, position fix times) as well as SIRU flight system data (navigation


variables, attitude, failure data, sensor data, status information). The


radar tapes contain time-tagged range, elevation, and azimuth as measured by


each of two radars during those time intervals when the CV-340 aircraft was


tracked. The SIRU tapes' data were produced and recorded through the SIRU


navigation system's two H316 computers, while the radar tapes' data were


generated by a PDP 1145 computer.


Data processing for the flight tests was performed on the NASA-Ames


IBM 360/67 and CDC 7600 computers and at Draper Laboratory on the IBM 360/75.


Differences in word lengths and word structures among the various computers
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necessitated considerable programming to extract the desired data from the


tapes. Because the CDC 7600 was not operational at Ames at the beginning of


the flight test program, the data reduction programs were programmed for Ames'


IBM 360/67. These programs were later converted to permit data reduction on


the CDC 7600.


SIRU data processvng- The phases of SIRU test data processing at Ames are


illustrated in figure 16. Programs are shown as rectangular blocks in the


figure, while tapes and disk data files are denoted by circles and small
 

ellipses, respectively.


Phase I produced a navigation data file and could also produce a gyro and
 

accelerometer data file or raw data file by input option. The gyro and


accelerometer data file contained the derived triad sensor data used in SIRU's


attitude and navigation computations The derived triad data were the result


of compensation, failure isolation, and mapping of the six raw measurements


into three components. The raw data file contained uncompensated measurement
 

data from SIRU's six gyros and six accelerometers. Phase I produced a printed


tabulation of the flight and the reduced data files and included the tape


copying process necessary for parallel-flight test data processing by Draper


Laboratory.


Phase II required the navigation data file of Phase I as input. Program


RADAR read and interpreted the radar tape (for flights with radar coverage)


and produced a radar-derived trajectory file and a merged SIRU and radar data


file. Program RADAR also computed and tabulated residuals between radar and


SIRU estimates of position. Recorded time code generator times from the two


sources (i.e., airplane and test facility) were used to synchronize the data.


Program DMERES used a least-squares differential correction technique to


derive a trajectory from recorded DME range data and wrote the trajectory as a


DME file


Phase III featured the SIR Navigation Analysis Program (SNAP) which com­

puted an aided-inertial trajectory. This program also estimated likely error


sources from the DME and/or the radar data (ref. 3). SNAP used DIE and baro­

altimeter data from the navigation data file and radar data from the merged


data file. It also used equivalent-triad gyro and accelerometer data from the


gyro and accelerometer data file. The aided-inertial (reference) trajectory


was written on the smoothed navigation data file. Navigation and attitude


residuals between the smoothed and SIRU estimates were also tabulated. Navi­

gation residuals from each flight test are presented in Volume III of this


report.


Plotting programs were used in Phase IV of the data reduction process to


produce latitude-versus-longitude trajectory plots and to position residual


strip-charts. Trajectory data from computer A's navigation data file could be


plotted with trajectory data from computer B's navigation data. Program STRIP


computed (and plotted versus time) north, east, and root-sum-square position
 

residuals between any two trajectory files. Hard-copy plots were produced


from computer-generated tapes at Ames Research Center's central computer
 

facility. Ground track plots from each of the flight tests are presented in


Volume IIL.
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The 16-bit data words from each SIRU flight computer were recorded on tape

together with eight bits of computer status information (which included a com­

puter identity bit). Words from computers A and B were usually interspersed


in fixed-length records 
 on the tape and had to be sorted by using the computer

identity bit. Each record contained 241-1/3 24-bit data/status words Three


sequential records had to be read to get an integer number of data/status


words into the ground processing computer. Recorded SIRU data were grouped on


the tape (for each computer) by type (i.e., navigation data, sensor data, key­

board input, status). Each type was identified by a code word. Data types


were recorded at differing rates (i.e., navigation at 1 Hz, sensor data usually


at 20 Hz). Several different procedures were used to interpret and convert


the data to usable form because several different scalings and bit structures


were used in recording the data.


Radar data processtng- All of the radar tapes from the SIRU Flight Test


Program contained recorded data from both radars located at Crows Landing.


The tapes were written by a PDP 1145 computer and, like SIRU flight tapes,


their data required considerable software processing before being used in


calculations on the IBM 360/67 or CDC 7600 computers.


Radar data were usually recorded at 20 Hz, although there were some


exceptions. Every data frame was time-tagged with Universal Mean Time (UMT)


as read to 0.0001 sec from a time code generator at the test facility. SIRU's


navigation data were recorded at 1 Hz, and recorded UMT was included from a


time code generator carried on board the CV-340. Program RADAR used only the


1 Hz radar data (i.e., every twentieth frame if radars were recorded at 20 Hz,


synchronized as closely as possible to SIRU's recorded navigation times).


SIRU's technique for sampling the time code generator gave a resolution of


25 msec to SIRU's recorded time. The recorded radar data were cycled until


SIRU and radar times agreed to within 25 msec. The data were then sampled at


1 Hz to stay in synchronization with SIRU. The synchronization uncertainty


could amount to a position uncertainty of about 3 m if the CV-340 aircraft


speed was taken to be 120 m/sec.


The measured radar data were presented on the tape in raw counts, using


nineteen bits (parts of two 16-bit words) to express each measurement. The


measurements were biased by "given" calibration or zero values before being


scaled to appropriate units (i.e., feet or meters and radians). The calibra­

tion values varied from flight to flight and were not readily obtained from


the radar tape Rather, they were transmitted by hand from readings taken at


the test facility. A shortcoming of the radar tape recording procedure was


that ranges "overflowed" every 219 counts (-21 n. mi.) which often required


external information to resolve the ambiguity.


Program RADAR used (on option) either target-tracking radar or missile­

tracking radar range/azimuth/elevation data to derive the,position information


which was written on the radar data file. The position derived from the radar


data was compared with the SIRU system's indicated position to produce a tabu­

lated position residual history. In this comparison, radar-derived altitude


above mean sea level was compared with barometric altitude. The merged data
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file was simply a navigation data file with measured range, elevation, and


azimuth from the two radars appended.


DAIS Data Prooessing- OME range data were transferred from the SIRU flight


tape to the navigation data file by program QUICK. Program DMERES then read
 

the navigation data tile and derived position (i.e., latitude and longitude)


from the range data.


Program DMERES obtained DME frequencies and ranges for each recorded SIRU


time from the navigation data file. OME frequencies were compared with a


stored list of candidate DME frequencies. Table 2 lists the stored DE data


with the DME's range and bearing from Crows Landing and with the acquisition


altitude there. When the DE's frequency was identified from this list, the
 

corresponding stored DME location was used in Program DNERES's position calcu­

lations. When the frequency, could not be found in the list, the corresponding


measured range was omitted from further position calculations.
 

The problem of nonconcurrency of measurements was treated by calculation


of range-rate (using SIRU's velocity in the calculation) and prediction of


range from the most recent time the range from a particular DNE was refreshed.


Range was considered to be refreshed when it changed in value or when the


OME's frequency changed. A zero value for range was recorded when no "lock-on"


occurred.


Program DMERES did not try to form a position solution with less than two


range measurements. When two or more range measurements were active, Program


DERES performed an iterative differential correction calculation to adjust


the position so that the sum of the squared range residuals was minimized.


The resulting position was written out as a function of time. Rounding off the


apparent time of the measurement range to the nearest whole second introduced a


potential position error of 100 m.


SIRU FLIGHT TEST RESULTS


Flight tests of SIRU were performed on 15 separate days, beginning


May 20, 1975 and concluding September 24, 1975. Some of these tests included


multiple segments, and each segment produced a magnetic tape of recorded SIRU


test data. In most cases, SIRD was fine-aligned between segments, so that


each segment could be considered a separate flight test. Thirty-four segments


were flown. One of the tapes could not be read by the software on the Ames


computers. The other 33 segments totaled about 36 hr in navigation, 26 hr of


which were spent in flight.


Individual Flight Commentary and Description


In the following discussion, comments are offered concerning the progress


made during each of the flights. More detailed descriptions of each individ­

ual flight including the test objective, computer and inertial component
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configuration, failures scheduled, flight description, durations from the


flight plan, test times (warm up, fine alignment, navigation, and flight),


general comments, and ground track plots are presented in appendix A (Vol­

ume III) The first several flights were intended to remove problems and


finalize the test procedures.


Test Flight No. 1. (5/20) This was flown from Moffett Field to Crows


Landing by way of San Jose Airport and Lick Observatory on Mt. Hamilton with­

out new sensor calibration after delivery from Hanscom Field, Massachusetts.


Only the output of the B computer was recorded during the first two flights


because of observed anomalies of the A computer.


Test Flight No 2. (5/30) The flight was to include a segment from


Crows Landing to Bakersfield This segment was modified to Crows Landing-

Los Banos-Fresno-Crows Landing when the observed navigation error became too


large. The flight continued to Moffett Field without landing at Crows Landing


because of high cabin temperatures expected on the ground. (The air condition­

ing system in the CV-340 had proven inadquate earlier.) Three tapes of radar


data recorded at 100 Hz were provided.


Test Flight No. 3 (6/16) By the third flight the problem with computer


A had been corrected, but the multiple unscheduled sensor failures and poor


navigation experienced on the first flights continued without explanation


The radar at Crows Landing was inoperable for this third flight because of


computer problems.


Test Flight No. 4. (6/18) Because of the air conditioning problem, the


fourth flight test was made at night, when it was cooler. This 4-hr flight


test was intended to exhibit SIRU's navigation capabilities. Because of pro­

cedural problems, SIRU exhibited a 34 n. mi. maximum position error, thus


negating the original intent of the tests The radar computers were still


having problems, so the only radar data consisted of several pages of hand­

recorded readings laboriously taken by the radar operators during the flight.


These have never been processed.


Test Flight No 5 (6/25). By the fifth flight, radar readings were again


recorded on tape, although the actual recording rate differed from that speci­

fied on the tape's format record. The time code generator was initialized


incorrectly by 1 hr for this flight, which further complicated the SIRU/radar


data synchronization process. Unscheduled sensor failures continued to show


up, and navigational performance was poor, even though long calibration and


alignment sequences were carried out before each flight.


Test Flight No. 6. (7/14). Longitude for the sixth flight was initial­

ized in error by 10 This flight, which had no radar coverage, was again


plagued by unscheduled sensor failures, and it exhibited very poor naviga­

tional performance


Before the seventh flight, several modifications were incorporated into


SIRU which resulted in generally improved navigation and fewer unscheduled


sensor failures The modifications included using "old" accelerometer
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compensation values obtained the year before in the Draper Laboratory tests


rather than values obtained in the preflight calibration procedure. Based on


data from the earlier flights, the failure detection threshold was modified to


include a variable detection tolerance level for the gyros. The detection


level was increased, and the dynamic portion was revised to accommodate the


total squared error increase during turning maneuvers. The statistical fail­

ure detection, isolation, classification, and recompensation algorithm was
 

also removed from operation in the navigation mode. The flight schedule did


not permit reinstatemen of the statistical failure detection, isolation,


classification, and recompensation algorithm during the remaining flights.


However, volume III presents an analysis of the data using this algorithm with


recommended corrective action.


Test Flight No. 7. (7/17): The seventh flight showed marked improvement


in both navigation and failure indication. Navigation error decreased by an


order of magAitude over previous flight tests, and no unscheduled sensor


failures were encountered. In addition, radar coverage was again available


(for overflight), although Crows Landing was closed to civilian landings and


takeoffs. The first scheduled inflight gyro failures were successfully


detected and isolated during the return segment of this flight.


Test Flight No. 8. (7/24): The eighth test was again successful, being


characterized by relatively small navigation errors, no unscheduled sensor


failures, and proper detection and isolation of scheduled gyro and accelerom­

eter failures. The scheduled failures were inserted into only the B-computer's


compensation logic during the third segment of this flight, thereby enabling,


for the first time, a comparison between "unfailed-SIRU" and "failed-SIRU"


navigation. This comparison showed the relative navigation error buildup due


to the use of the failed sensor's data between the time the failure takes


place and the time the failure is isolated. Good radar coverage was obtained


for this flight and on through to the end of the program. An unfortunate


aspect of the eighth flight was that only the first of three segments was


recorded until completion of the segment. The other two segments ran out of


tape. Only 731.5 m (2400 ft) tapes were available for this flight, and the


tape moves almost 1 ft per second of real time when both computers are


recording at full rate.


Test Flight No. 9. (7/29): The ninth flight again exhibited unscheduled


failures and degraded navigation. Some scheduled gyro failures were, never­

theless, correctly detected and isolated. The first segment was marred by
 

the fact that the tape recorder was not started until 1100 see into navigation,


at which time the aircraft was in the air over San Jose.


Test Flight No. 10. (8/22): This flight suffered computer and/or tape


recording malfunctions as well as several unscheduled sensor failures. Sched­

uled catastrophic gyro failures in the second and third segments were success­

fully detected and isolated; however, the first and second segments of the
 

flight showed fairly good and very good navigation, respectively. During the


third segment (Crows Landing to Bakersfield), the B computer recorded naviga­

tional data at 20 Hz much of the time. Only a small portion of the tape for


the return from Bakersfield was readable. There were many computer failures
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indicated on the display panel for this segment Some intentional computer


failures were also injected on this flight. Computer failures were observed


on no other flights in the program


Test Flight No. 11. (8/29)- This flight showed no unscheduled sensor


failures while successfully isolating nearly-simultaneous scheduled failures


in gyros A and B Navigation was not very good on the Moffett Field-to-Crows


Landing segment of this flight. It was good on the second segment which con­

sisted of flying patterns at Crows Landing SIRU's position was reset and the


velocity was zeroed in midnavigation on the second segment of this flight,


resulting in a navigational discontinuity.


Test Flight No. 12. (9/05): This flight was the last flight involving


scheduled failures. These scheduled failures were successfully detected and


isolated, although some unscheduled failures were indicated as well. Naviga­

tion was relatively good.


Test Flight No. 13 (9/10) This flight featured multi-maneuver patterns


at Crows Landing with no scheduled failures and with little regard for naviga­

tional performance (which still turned out to be fair). This flight was


almost free of unscheduled failures. SIRU was fine-aligned before the flight


but was otherwise kept in the navigation mode throughout the flight. Tapes


were changed while the aircraft was stationary at Crows Landing.


Test Flight No. 14. (9/18). This was a repeat of Flight 13, except that


SIRU was fine-aligned before the flight and also before returning to Moffett


Field.


Test Flight No. 15. (9/24): The final flight was the longest of the


series. It exhibited good navigation performance and there were no indicated


sensor failures.


Figure 17 depicts navigation mode duration, in-flight duration, and radar


coverage periods for the 15 flight tests. The flight date appears on the left


side of the figure. Each flight segment is represented by an unbroken hori­

zontal line Later segments are shown relative to the zero time of the first


segment for each multi-segment flight. Navigation duration for any segment is


indicated by the length of the segment's unbroken line. The darkened portion


of the line indicates time in flight, with "T" indicating take-off and "L"


indicating landing. Radar coverage periods are indicated by parenthesized


line segments just above the navigation segments. It may be observed that


12 of the 15 flights had at least some radar coverage. DME coverage, although


of poorer accuracy than the radar coverage, was present in almost unbroken


fashion for every flight test segment.


Table 4 summarizes characteristics of the SIRU flight tests. Navigation


mode and flight duration (in seconds) are shown, after a brief description of


the route flown by the CV-340 Radar intersection is the total common time


"Marks"
interval for which there are data on both the SIRU and radar tapes. 
 
denotes the number of position fixes taken and recorded "Computers" identi­

fies which computers were recorded and whether they differed when both were
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recorded. "Rate" denotes whether raw sensor data were recorded at the high


rate (H) (20 Hz) or low (L) (1 Hz) rate.
 

I 
Maximum position error is shown in nautical miles and, in most cases,


refers to the DME-derived position, which is assumed to be correct. The maxi­

mum error usually (but not always) occurs at the end of the recorded segment.


It should be noted that some tests were flown without particular concern for


navigation accuracy and that operational mistakes are included with the errors.


Detected failures are listed in the last two columns. Failure, in the


context of this report, means that the performance of a given instrument,


(gyro or accelerometer), exceeded a "predetermined" limit that had been


established in the failure detection software. The predetermined limit is set


by the need to minimize false alarms during operation. Failure levels are


determined by sensor random errors, uncompensated modeling errors, digital


system noise and temporary or permanent shifts in the sensor operating points


Unscheduled failures are those which were unintentional; scheduled failures


were deliberately injected by nuscompensating the sensors at some point in


flight. The notation "G (FCBDEA)," for example, indicates that every gyro


failed at some time during the test with F being the first to fail. Acceler­

ometer failures are indicated, for example, by the notation A (D), which means


that only accelerometer D failed on the segment. Only two failures of either


type of sensor can be indicated by SIRU at any one time.


General Navigation Accuracy Results


Free inertsaZ navtgatvon performance- Appendix A (Volume III) shows the


ground track plots of the 33 recoverable flight test segments. Each plot
 

shows SIRU's best ground track estimate as a solid curve. The dotted paths


show aircraft ground tracks computed from DEE or radar data or SIRU's other


computer. A summary of the test conditions and calibration is included


Appendix B (Volume III) shows the navigation position error (residuals)


histories for the same 33 recoverable flight test segments. These residuals


are based upon DME-derived or radar-derived position versus time. All resid­

uals are plotted in nautical miles.


The SIRU system's navigation accuracy was evaluated by comparing the com­

puted position with an independently derived position from one of the external


position references during the same computer frame time. Except for occasional


intervals of bad data, the external position references were in close agree­

ment throughout the SIRU test program.


The position differences (in feet) shown in table 5 were computed from


data obtained from the three position references. The differences between the


radar position and the position computed from the time-referenced driftmeter


photographs are labeled "R-M." The differences between the DEE-derived posi­

tion and the driftmeter photograph position are labeled "D-M." Finally, the


differences between the radar-derived position and the DME-derived position 
are labeled "R-D." An average residual for each of the three position 
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measurement difference methods is given in table 6. These errors show close


agreement, with the radar-derived and driftmeter-derived measurements being


closest


Discrepancies among the references were small compared to the SIRU sys­

tem's navigation errors In each instance where the system's B-computer dif­

fered from its A computer (by the insertion of scheduled failures into B and


not into A), the navigation error estimate from the A computer, which was more


likely to be accurate, was used in performance calculations.


Table 7 summarizes the SIRU system's navigation performance during the


flight test program. The maximum position error (residual) appears after the


flight and navigation duration columns in the table. This maximum error does


not necessarily occur at the end of the navigation segment because the naviga­

tion error does not grow linearly with time. Again, it should be noted that


obtaining good navigational accuracy was not an objective for some flights, so


calibration and alignment procedures were relaxed. In an attempt to represent


the navigation error as a simple function of time, these errors were fitted by


the least-squares method to the following three functions:


1. A constant (the average, shown in column 4 of table 7)


2. A straight line through the origin (slope is shown in column 5)


3. A straight line A + Bt (with A and B shown in columns 6 and 7)


A popular single-number characterization of navigation system accuracy


is, "x nautical miles/hour " This implies that navigation errors are propor­

tional to time The slope of a fitted straight line through the origin


(column 5 of table 7) serves as a single-number accuracy characterization for


the SIRU flight test program. Flight segments 9/10A, 9/10B, 9/10C, and 9/10D


were navigationally contiguous, as were segments 9/18A, 9/18B, and 9/18C.
 

Segment 9/18D was fine-aligned and reinitialized The table entries for maxi­

mum error on these multi-segment flights display the local maxima (i.e., each


segment considered alone), which accounts for segment 9/18C showing a smaller


maximum than 9/18B The curve fits shown for each flight segment were deter­

mined from all data up to and including that segment. For example, the


straight-line error slope shown for segment 9/lOC (5.37 n. mi./hr) is based on


segments 9/10A, 9/10B, and 9/10C.


Figure 18 displays the maximum navigation error (column 3 of table 7)


versus flight date. The letters (A, B, C, and D) which appear in the figure


alongside the plotted error values denote the flight segment on which the


plotted error occurred Figure 19 displays the resulting navigation error


slope (column 5 of table 7) versus flight date These figures show


Generally improved navigational performance with time into the test


program


1 
 
2. Wide variations in navigation performance between segments of par­

ticular flights


On the basis of figure 19, the SIRU system's navigation accuracy rating at the
 

end of the test program was about 3 to 4 n. mi./hr, although flight 9/24
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indicated 1.02 n. mi./hr., The wide variations between same-day segments were


due to alignment uncertainties and human error, because bias and scale factor


sensor output corrections were common among these segments. The variations


were also caused by the effects of different maneuvers on dynamic sensor


compensations.


Navvgatton error due to f-ne alignment angular motton- Navigation accu­

racy is limited by the precision in alignment of the computational coordinate


frame relative to the physical coordinate frame at the instant that the


navigation mode begins. The SIRU fine-alignment algorithm (variable gain


gyrocompassing) was performance-verified in the laboratory under static


conditions and in the presence of small sinusoidal oscillations about the


vertical system axis. However, alignment performance in the presence of


larger angular motion about the horizontal axes (causing accelerometer out­

puts to vary) was not investigated prior to flight testing.


The fine-alignment algorithm generated commanded rotation rates about the


Down, East, and South axes to bring the attitude quaternion into proper align­

ment. Earth rate compensation was included in the commanded rates. Base


motion isolation was implemented with standard gyro information. The East and


South axes commanded rates should converge to zero and to the South component
 

of earth rate, respectively. The Down axis commanded rate should converge to


the Down earth rate component.


The CV-340 was subject to unpredictable angular motion about its center


of gravity during the SIRU fine-alignment mode. Thus it was of interest to


determine if this random motion had a deleterious effect on subsequent naviga­

tional performance. An experiment was conducted to determine the effects of


this angular motion on later navigation error propagation. This experiment


consisted of a single special test designed to observe navigation performance


during alignment in the aircraft. The fine-align operating program was modi­

fied to record the commanded rotation rates to bring the attitude quaternion
 

into proper alignment. It was not possible, however, to make a precise eval­

uation of fine-alignment navigation errors from the recorded flight test data


because raw navigation data (for reconstruction purposes) and the algorithm


command signals were not recorded. At times, the quaternion was also observed


(as well as recorded) during alignment. Because the quaternion tracks base


motion while responding to commanded rotation signals, it alone could not be


used as a measure of alignment performance. These data did indicate the pos­

sible presence of convergence errors; however, during the test the down com­

manded rate did not converge on the down component of earth rate as it should


have. The negative excursion caused a 3-mrad change in the algorithm's esti­

mate of true North and a 0.07 mrad change in the level estimate of East. The


control loops were in a steady-state condition for about 1500 sec.


This evidence, together with failure detection and isolation algorithm
 

performance data showing that all gyros and accelerometeis were online and


reasonably stable throughout the test, indicated that the SIRU base-motion


isolation was not good enough. Angular motion did not exceed 0.5' about any
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axis during this special test, yet the SIRU fine-alignment was undesirably
 

disturbed. One possible reason is that mnscompensated accelerometer data


caused alignment errors in the gyro data when acceleration-sensitive attitude


changes occurred Unless the average East and South angular velocities con­

verge to zero (as they ideally would), the alignment algorithm would begin


generating an erroneous attitude correction signal resulting in steady-state


"level-definition" and "north-definition" errors.


The magnitude of the navigation errors resulting from alignment algorithm


problems is unknown because compensation values and environmental conditions


varied throughout the flight tests and were not recorded.


Navtgatvon error from gyro mtsaltgnment- Gyro scale factor and misalign­

ment compensation values cannot be readily determined when the strapdown sys­

tem is mounted in the aircraft This fact presents fundamental problems when


installing a replacement gyro, for instance Laboratory compensation data


must be transferred to the operating environment with an uncertain level of


confidence.


Errors from these terms (particularly misalignments) show up most notice­

ably when the aircraft makes large changes in heading. Navigation accuracy


may be impaired by the typically large (1800) turns which occur on the taxiway


prior to takeoff and in the air shortly afterwards


The error equation residuals from the deterministic total squared error


failure detection algorithm proved to be of some help in gauging the magnitude


of these dynamc gyro errors. In one case, a badly miscompensated gyro was


greatly improved by observing squared gyro-error magnitudes and adjusting a


particular misalignment value to substantially decrease this error magnitude


over a 1800 turn. Specifically, it was found that abnormally high total


squared errors were present during large turns of flight tests in June and the


first half of July, 1975 Turns of 1800 produced total squared errors from


70 to 90 pulses squared (44 arcsec/pulse). These errors corresponded to an


acquired system attitude error in the vicinity of 400 arcsec, or about


600 ppm


Ground experiments led to making a 0.25-mrad correction to the C gyro


(nominally horizontal input axis) misalignment term in the direction of the
 

nominal vertical axis Subsequent flight tests (July 24 to termination) had


uniformly lower total squared errors of from 20 to 30 pulses squared for 1800


turns. This corresponded to an acquired system attitude error of about


200 arcsec, or 300 ppm. This improvement in total squared errors was expected


after making the correction in misalignment compensation.


Further trial and error improvements to dynamic compensation terms were


not attempted. The redundant nature of the SIRU should permit a selfcorrect­

ing misalignment calibrator to be implemented which would yield much smaller


attitude errors during typical flight test maneuvers.


A simple example shows the effect of malsalignment errors on navigation


accuracy. Assume that an aircraft with a perfectly initialized alignment of
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the SIRU system makes a 1800 turn on the runway prior to takeoff. Assume all


six gyros are perfectly compensated except one nominally horizontal gyro


(C-gyro) which is misaligned toward the vertical by a small amount, 6 radians.


The 1800 turn has a zero component along the C-axis, but a total rotation


( 1800) is erroneously registered. This translates into a body-axis compu­

tati6nal misalignment of (1800 - 61/); this can be viewed as an initial level


error. This initial level error starts a position error propagating with an


84-mn (Schuler) period and with an angular magnitude (relative to the earth's


center) equal to the magnitude of the system's level-error. The position


error magnitude, in nautical miles, is approximately:


l()l:60ren m. 800° c° t~ - _ Co 
degre (1800 [ - 4o(2Min)] 
Peak position error magnitude (at t = 42 mn) is


peak= 60 n. mi. (1800. 6)


degree


A misalignment error of 6 = 0.250 mrad in this example would then yield a
 

peak position error of 2.7 n. n.
 

Navgatton errors from fat led gyros durvng failure detection and tsola­
tton algorithm tests- A hard attitude gyro failure causes an angular error


increment (misalignment) in the inertial system's attitude reference. This


misalignment causes navigational errors similar to other misalignments Also,


the strapdown system is subject to further alignment errors when large angular


motions of the aircraft occur.
 

The failure detection and isolation total squared error algorithm which


monitored the gyros had an error threshold (maximum allowable squared error)


set to a base level of 40 pulses squared (44 aresec per gyro pulse) for flight


tests in July, August, and September. A dynamic increase in the maximum


allowable squared error of up to 120 pulses squared was programmed for changes


in body attitude of 1800 (or more) during any total squared error accumulation


period (2 to 4 min).


If all but one of the gyros was well compensated, then the attitude error


deviation caused by gyro failure would be similar to the velocity error devia­

tion caused by accelerometer failure. Gyro errors occur due to both bias and


misalignment errors, so the error was modeled simply as an angular error,


GE(t), from one bad gyro. For a nonrotating system, the maximum allowable


squared error was 40 pulses squared and maximum OE was 0.95 mrad. The maxi­

mum body attitude error was one-half that of the failed gyro, or 0.475 mrad.


When large angular motions occurred, the maximum allowable squared error was


four times its static value. Hence, the maximum body attitude error from a


singl6 misaligned gyro was twice that of a static error.
 

Navigation errors froma a failed horizontal input axis gyro were most sig­

nificant earlier in the flight. For example, the resulting Schuler-period


position error (for 0.475 mrad level error) reached a first peak magnitude at
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43 min and was 3.28 n. ml. This value occurred only for static navigation or


low speed flight at a constant heading Heading changes increased the error


A comprehensive example from a flight test on September 5, 1975, demon­

strates the effect a failed gyro had on navigation performance. This flight


(9/5C) was a loop flight out of Crows Landing with a navigation mode duration


of 39 mln. Both A and B computers were initialized and aligned together. The


F gyro had an unscheduled failure during alignment and was kept offline in


both computers for the remainder of the test. A programmed 6°/hr bias error
 

was inserted into the E gyro compensation of the B computer after the flight


was underway. The A computer provided a reference. E and F gyros were in the


aircraft y-z plane (wing-vertical) so the unscheduled F gyro failure made the


system's navigation performance more sensitive to the scheduled E gyro failure


than would otherwise be the case.


Figure 20 shows the reference computer's computed heading (truncated at


3600) for the period of navigation The maximum allowable squared error value


shown in figure 21 for computer A was calculated on the basis of angular


motion observed over the total squared error accumulation period The plots


in figures 22 and 23 (for computers A and B) show how the total squared error


forcing function was used to increase the maximum allowable squared error


value up to the maximum of 160 pulses squared.


The A computer is seen to have an increased total squared error during


the turns, but not enough to incur a failure indication. The E gyro scheduled


failure was inserted in the B computer shortly after 2700 sec and the E gyro


was taken offline about 50 sec later. The total squared error at removal was


changing between 40 and 160 pulses squared because the maximum allowable


squared error reverted toward its static value at the end of a 2-mmn accumula­

tion period. At 2700 sec, the gyro fail status of computer B changed from F


only to both E and F offline At 3500 sec, E gyro's bias error was removed


and gyro fail status reverted to "F-failed-only "


The resulting attitude of the B computational body frame compared to the


A body frame is shown in figures 24-29. These figures are complicated some­

what by the fact that the aircraft made a 90* turn while E gyro was degraded,


but before it was taken offline. The scheduled failure caused an initial


"A tilt about y" and "A azimuth" that reached a maximum of 2 2 arcmin and


1.4 arcmin, respectively.
 

Because of aircraft motion, the navigation position error does not fit a


simple form. Figure 27 shows a maximum "speed" residual (difference in com­

puters B and A) of 9.7 n. mi./hr. The longitude and latitude errors contin­

ued to increase after scheduled failure removal because of heading error, as


shown in figures 28 and 29.


Assessment of tnertsally smoothed radio navigation- An analysis of the
 

SIRU's potential for inertially smoothed radio navigation (i e., aided­

inertial navigation) indicated that a DME/baro/inertial SIRU could easily


maintain a navigation accuracy of a few hundred meters. These indications
 

were obtained by performing the necessary calculations during postflight using


flight test data.
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The SIRU Navigation Analysis Program software was modified to enable


computation of inertially smoothed radio navigation data using DNE data for


position fixes. The implemented scheme used a batch update in which incremen­

tal state changes were computed and put into the state estimate only once per


minute. Figure 30 shows the position residual history between the inertially­

smoothed DME-derived posit-ion and the time-averaged radar-derived position for


SIRU flight test no. 9/05B. The top curve displays the northward residual,


the middle curve displays the eastward residual, and the bottom curve displays


the root-sum-square residual. The segmented appearance is caused by the dis­

crete updating process of the Kalman filter. The maximum root-sum-square


position error was about 0.2 n. mi. (-400 m) as compared to the free-inertial


navigation maximum error of -3.7 n. mi. on the same flight. Ground "fixes"


were processed as measurements at both ends of the trajectory to use the


information that the aircraft was stationary before and after flight.


DME ranges, which had no recoverable recorded time tags, were assumed to


be measured at even seconds of navigation time when the range value was


observed to change The DME measurement weight in the filter was obtained


empirically by observing DME range residuals on radar data.
 

It may be possible to improve the failure detection and isolation capa­

bilities of redundant systems such as the SIRU by external aiding. A Kalman


filter using external reference data can be formulated to solve for sensor


biases and to predict sensor measurements for use in failure detection and


isolation calculations. This represents an interesting and worthwhile exten­

sion of this work.


Assessment of applicaton to short-haul fltght control- The concept of 
serving both navigation and flight control functions with a single (redundant)


sensor package is appealing, especially from total system cost considerations.


The SIRU was flight tested as the sensing package for navigation, but not for


flight control. However, some sensor data from the flight test program were


analyzed for integrated short-haul flight control applications.
 

Figure 31 shows equivalent-triad gyro and accelerometer data histories


from the static, engines-running portion of flight 9/18B. The top three plots
 

show measured angular increments sampled at 20/sec versus time. The lower


three plots show accelerometer output versus time. The scattering (digital


noise) observed in these plots is primarily caused by quantization of the


sensors' output signals. The gyro resolution used for the SIRU was


44 arcsec/bit (0.0002 rad/bit), while the accelerometer resolution was


0.04 m/sec/bit. The scattering was caused by the mapping of six sensor out­

puts into three orthogonal components when each of the six individual integrat­

ing sensors could change output only by quantized steps. The range of this


scattering could be reduced by improving the resolution of a bit.


The 1-sec average of one of the triad measurements is more representative


of the real input than any one sample. In navigation use, the running time


average of the sensor outputs to produce position and velocity increments pro­

vides smoothing prior to the calculation of attitude and navigation quantities.


In flight control applications, the signals would require filtering to
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remove the quantization noise depicted in figure 31. With filtering, a flight


control servo loop could probably use such signals.


Figures 32, 33, and 34 show equivalent triad sensor outputs (gyro and


accelerometer) for takeoff, maneuvering cruise, and landing Figure 32 shows


the takeoff phase, and figure 33 shows maneuvering cruise. Figure 34 suggests


that the digital noise from the 44-arcsec quantization (without filtering)


would prohibit the use of such data in flight control systems.
 

Another consideration is that an input gyro measurement with an upper


limit of 1 rad/sec full-scale is too low for many flight control applications.
 

However, scale changing for higher full-scale capacity without increasing word


length would increase quantization values. These, in turn, would adversely


affect the digital noise. Current technology can provide 1 6-arcsec quantiza­

tion at 2 rad/sec full-scale. This should be a design goal of future strap­

down test systems.


The SIRU's experimentally measured performance in failure detection and


isolation would qualify the SIRU for flight control application, although


near-simultaneous accelerometer bias-shifts took excessive time to detect and


isolate. The levels of gyro failures which SIRU successfully isolated were in


the noise level of conventional rate gyros. Isolating accelerometer bias


shifts of 0.001 g in 1.5 min is adequate performance for short-haul flight


control reliability.


Failure Detection and Isolation (FDI) Algorithm Performance


Dzscuss-uon- The deterministic SIRUI failure detection algorithm was based


upon computing the sum total of the squared error of each inertial sensor type


and comparing it against a dynamically changing threshold called maximum


allowable squared error When the total squared error exceeded the threshold


(maximum allowable squared error) by a certain ratio, a sensor fault was


indicated.


The total squared error for each of the six inertial sensor sets is


normally less than the internally defined maximum allowable squared error.


The maximum allowable squared error values were extracted from the "normal"


total squared error values observed in early flights. The minimum values of


the maximum allowable squared error were determined by the sensor quantization.


Each maximum allowable squared error was modified dynamically for a desired


level of sensor error detection. Setting the maximum allowable squared error


too low could lead to predictable but false "failures" during certain aircraft


maneuvers. Setting the maximum allowable squared error too high could lead to


undetected but real sensor failures The selected maximum allowable squared


error values were a function of quantization, digital system noise, and


aircraft maneuvers.


The total squared error failure detection algorithm was executed at each


inertial (gyro or accelerometer) data update point. This theoretically


enabled "failed" instruments to be taken offline without causing excessive
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perturbation to the computed aircraft attitude or velocity. The SIRU update


rate was 20/sec.
 

Failure isolation consisted of computing the individual squared error of


each sensor. The squared error for each instrument was formed by comparing a


sensQr's compensated output data with the redundant estimate of its output


created from the other (similar) five sensors. These errors were summed over


2-min time intervals, compared, and the largest error sum used to indicate the


faulted sensor. Usable values of total squared error and maximum allowable


squared error depend upon accurate calibration and stability of the sensor's


output. If the sensor output is stable, then its output accuracy is mainly


dependent on the correctness of software compensation values and the complete­

ness of the sensor error model. Likewise, the correctness of the fault detec­

tion algorithm output is dependent upon the calibrated compensation values and


error models used to adjust each sensor's output signal. These compensation


values and error models (particularly the angular rate-dependent terms), were


known with a lesser degree of accuracy in the aircraft environment than in the


laboratory where a precision rate table was used to measure them.


Strapdown accelerometers experienced only minor uncalibrated variations 
in specific force for a typical CV-340 flight as compared to the static situa­
tion. Their readings were very stable, and their calibration numbers remained 
nearly constant for over 1 yr. For the first flights, they were recalibrated 
prior to each flight For Flight 7/17 and to the end of the program, the 
static calibration numbers the laboratory measured a year earlier were used. 
Therefore, the accelerometer maximum allowable squared error was set at a 
constant value for the entire alignment/navigation flight test duration after 
Flight 7/17 
The integrating rate gyros experienced major uncalibrated variations in


angular velocity in the CV-340 flight tests as compared to the static case


(ll,0000 /hr compared to 150 /hr). Gyros are less easily calibrated than


accelerometers. Also, the compensation terms are nonlinear with high rates


of change so the gyro maximum allowable squared error was set as a constant


plus an angular change-dependent value. This angular change-dependent value


was set proportional to the square of the net angular rotation that the system


had undergone while accumulating the total squared error. This maximum


allowable squared error value conformed reasonably well to typical gyro total


squared errors during unfailed-instrument flight tests.


Scheduled sensor "failures" were imposed on 11 of the flight test seg­

ments by purposely miscompensating a sensor's null bLas. Table 8 summarizes


the results of the recorded in-flight scheduled failure tests of the failure


detection and isolation capability. The level of failure shown is the amount


by which the null bias of the sensor was shifted in the test. The levels
 

shown in the table are from Draper Laboratory flight records which were not


recorded on the flight tape.


Unscheduled Sensor Failures. The following is a discussion of the
 

unscheduled inertial sensor axes failures which occurred during the flight


tests. The conclusions as to causes of the failures are based upon the corre­

lation of the removal of specific adverse operating conditions with the lack
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of recurrence of specific sensing axes failures. Table 9 is a tabulation of


these indicated failures and the adverse conditions which apparently caused


them.


The 43 unscheduled failures that occurred in Flights 1-6 could be attrib­

uted to improper sensor compensation. Failures which occurred after Flight 6


(7/17 through 9/24) could be attributed to thermal conditions. In two cases,


the adverse condition consisted of cold air from the aircraft air conditioning


jets blowing directly on the inertial component modules. This caused low


temperatures in the C accelerometer and E attitude gyro. Another adverse con­

dition was the high cabin air temperature (>88' F) which affected the E and


F gyros and the E accelerometer in 11 different instances. The cold air prob­

lem was solved by distributing the air flow


The high cabin air temperature problem was never satisfactorily solved.


It most frequently occurred after sitting on the ground in hot weather The


aircraft's air conditioning did not have the ability to maintain the cabin air


temperature below 880 F on the ground. No high-temperature-induced failures


were encountered after reaching cruising altitude.
 

The SIRU initial failure maximum allowable squared error threshold was


initially specified to be one and a half times the standard deviation of the
 

total squared gyro error (total squared error) which was derived from benign


laboratory tests. During SIRU flight tests, it was observed that the gyro


noise level was greatly increased in the flight environment as compared with


the laboratory environment. Therefore, after Flight 7 (7/17 through 9/24) the


implemented failure threshold was updated to match the preceding flight


dynamic data.


In Flights 1 (5/20) through 5 (6/25), the attitude gyro sensing total


squared error limits were set at a maximum allowable squared error of


0 760/hr,2 with a dynamic increase of 0.810/hr.2 For Flights 6 and 7 (7/14


and 7/17), the limits were increased to 1.140/hr.2 These limits were again


increased to 1.140/hr2 and 1.98°/hr2 from Flight 8 until the end of the pro­

gram. The statistical failure detection, isolation, classification and


recompensation algorithm was removed after Flight 7 because its operation was


correlated with a high level of false alarms


The unscheduled failures, on an individual flight basis, were as follows:


Test Flight No. 1. (5/20): Failures - C and F Gyros. This was a shake­

down flight without the 2-hr preflight calibration and warmup required for


thermal stability. The primary reason for the failures was insufficient


warmup time. This theory is supported by the fact that failures occurred


immediately after going into the fine alignment mode and the fact that a


C accelerometer low temperature fail signal was detected.


Test Flight No. 2. (5/30): Failures - All Gyros, A Accelerometer. This


flight was preceded by an aided single position calibration. The resultant
 

compensation had all of the gyro negative scale factor slopes accidentally


zeroed, the wrong sign was entered for the A accelerometer bias, and the wrong


value entered for the negative bias for the D gyro.
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Test Flight No. 2 (5/30B): Failures - ACEF Gyros, A Accelerometer. In


addition to the conditions that existed in the previous test, the cabin air


temperature was 1000 F.


Test Flight No. 3. (6/16A): Failures - ABCF Gyros, D Accelerometer. The


accelerometer biases were being changed for each flight from results of an


aided single or multiple position calibration which utilized a bubble level


with a defective mount. The apparent misalignment introduced by the inaccu­

rate accelerometer biases along with the low statistical failure detection,


isolation, classification and recompensation algorithm limits accounted for


the failures.


Test Flight No. 3. (6/16B): Failures - All Gyros, E Accelerometer. In


addition to the conditions that existed for the previous test (6/16A), the


cabin air temperature was 930 F. This caused the E accelerometer to fail.


Test Flight No. 4. (6/18): Failure - All Gyros, D Accelerometer. In


addition to the adverse conditions stated for Flight 6/16A, this flight was


preceded by an aided five-position calibration which utilized a wrong null


bias drift for the D gyro. Its drift equivalent was 0.4*/hr which corrupted


the other compensation parameter values derived from this calibration. These


adverse factors accounted for all the failures.
 

Test Flight No. 5. (6/25): Failures - AECD Gyros, BE Accelerometer. All


of the adverse conditions stated for Flight 4 (6/18) were also present for


this flight and account for the failures. The C and D gyro failures were


correlated with aircraft turn maneuvers and could be attributed to both the


improper accelerometer biases and the low statistical failure detection, iso­

lation, classification, and recompensation algorithm limits which were 0.76/hr


maximum allowable squared error with a maximum dynamic increase of 0.810/hr2 .


Test Flight No. 6. (7/14): Failures - ABCDF Gyros. All of the adverse
 

conditions stated for Flight 5 (6/25) were present for this flight test and


account for the failures. Again, there was a correlation between the C gyro


failure and the aircraft turn maneuvers.


Test Flight No. 9. (7/29A): Failures - BEF Gyros. The E gyro failure


resulted from cold air blowing directly on the E gyro module. The C acceler­

ometer module also indicated a temperature fail condition.


Note: After the blowing cold air problem was recognized, the


cold air was redistributed away from the sensor modules.


I 
Test Flight No. 9. (7/29B): Failure - E Gyro. The E attitude gyro


failed during fine alignment and was caused by blowing cold air as in Flight 9


(7/29A)


Test Flight No. 10. (8/22B): Failures - E Gyro, E Accelerometer. These


failures were caused by high cabin air temperatures while sitting on the


ground at Crow's Landing.


30


Test Flight No. 10. (8/22C) Failures - E and F Gyro, E Accelerometer


Same as Flight 8/22B.


Test Flight No. 10. (8/22D): Failure - E Gyro, E Accelerometer These


failures were caused by high cabin air temperature while sitting on the ground


at Bakersfield.


Test Flight No. 12. (9/05B). Failure - F Gyro This failure was caused
 

by high cabin air temperature.


Test Flight No. 12. (9/05C): Failure - F Gyro. Same as Flight 9/05B.
 

Test Flight No. 12. (9/05D): Failures - EF Gyros Same as Flight 9/05B.


Test Flight No. 14. (9/18D). Failures - EF Gyro, E Accelerometer. These


failures were caused by high cabin air temperature.


The failure detection and isolation algorithm identified deficiencies in


gyro dynamic modeling by indicating a "failure" in the sensor system. As


-indicated, it was necessary to increase the operating failure threshold


(maximum allowable squared error) to be compatible with system dynamics in the


flight environment. This defective dynamic error compensation was illustrated


by the data from Flight 14 (9/18B) which was analyzed in detail


The standard deviations of the six gyro parity equation residuals from


Flight 14 are presented in table 10. The parity residuals were sampled at


30-sec intervals. Because of the limited duration of this flight, only 14 data


points were available to be used in computation for the 30/sec counterclock­

wise turn, 16 data points for the 30/sec clockwise turn, and 6 data points for


the level flights. The maximum values for the standard deviations were:


Turns Level Flight


2.880 /hr 1.010 /hr


For a comparison, two data sets from dynamic tests conducted in the
 

(Draper) laboratory environment are presented: one set from slew tests


(5°/sec) and from oscillatory tests.


The parity residual standard deviation for slew (turn) tests was computed


to be 0.24°/hr. The laboratory test data were sampled at 2 mn intervals.


The standard deviations corresponding to 30-sec sample intervals for the


laboratory test data are found to be:


Lab Slew Data Lab Oscillatory Data


0.48°/hr 0.20 /hr


A comparison of the flight data for turning (2.88°/hr) and the slew test


data (0.480/hr) shows an increase of the standard deviation in flight test


data by a factor of 6. A comparison of the level flight data (l.010 /hr) with
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the laboratory oscillatory tests (0.20 /hr) shows improvement might be expected
 

if improved dynamic models were used for the aircraft environment.


SIRU Hardware and Software Limitations


During flight tests in the CV-340 aircraft, certain limitations were


experienced with respect to the SIRU hardware and software. Many of the lim­

itations were the result of the original SIRU design goal for a post-Apollo


advanced spacecraft inertial measurement unit.


Hardoare- The 18 IRIG MOD D integrating rate gyro was designed for con­

tinuous operation in a spacecraft environment. The orientation of the output


axes was optimized for the space mission, and therefore this orientation was


not optimum for an aircraft environment. Because of the operational safety


requirement to turn the system off when unattended, gyro parameter shifts were


encountered across cooldown and powerdown which necessitated frequent calibra­

tions. The quantization level of 44 arcsec was adequate for long term space


missions with periodic external updates, but was not adequate for the short­

term high-vibrational environment of the CV-340. The rate limitation of


1 rad/sec, again, is no problem in a spacecraft, but does represent a limita­

tion in an aircraft. A 2-hr warmup requirement prior to a 2-hr calibration is


no problem in'the long countdown of a spacecraft but is definitely unacceptable


for an operational aircraft (appendix G, Volume III).


The 16PM PIP specific force sensor (accelerometer) and its torque loop


were originally designed for the Poseidon missile. This accelerometer's


performance was adequate in all respects in the aircraft environment and


therefore posed no limitation. Its calibration was stable over a period of


1 yr.


Figure 35 shows both the theoretical and experimental failure detection


and isolation time of the attitude sensors as a function of failure magnitudd


Also indicated in figure 35 are flight control application requirements of


which inertially smoothed landing guidance requires the shortest failure


identification and removal time.


The torque rebalance loops used in SIRU (dictated by Apollo Technology)


were tailored to 44 arcsec angular resolution for the original spacecraft


application. It is apparent from figure 35 that this size is too large for


aircraft operations. Also included in figure 35 is a theoretical 1.6-arcsec


resolution (available in current strapdown INS technology) plot of attitude


failure rate versus failure identification and removal time This increased


resolution would provide considerable improvement over the 44-arcsec resolu­

tion results.


The SIRU sensor pallet mounting fixture was designed to permit calibra­

tion of the SIRU sensors in the aircraft. It provided positioning of the
 

inertial frame package to four cardinal points (900 rotations) about the


system Z axis and one 900 rotation to put the Z axis in the vertical or hori­

zontal plane. This permitted placing the ±X, ±Y, and +Z axes down individu­

ally for multiple position calibration. The design did not allow a -Z axis
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down orientation, however. This missing sixth position could have improved


the calibration accuracy.


A pair of wedge rings was provided to permit leveling the system prior to


the aided single- or multiple-position test. The sensor level was measured by


a 10-arcsec bubble mounted on the SIRU frame in a recessed well so that it


could be rotated 3600. The 10-arcsec bubble mounting surface had been preci­

sion machined with respect to the system reference cube. With repeated opera­

tions, its aluminum surface became worn and the repeatability of the measured


accelerometer biases was uncertain. The bubble continued to be used in level­

ing the system, but the accelerometer biases were not changed.


The SIRU sensor pallet cooling system was limited to an ambient air tem­

perature range of +40' to +88' F. The inertial component temperature con­

trollers could not control the gyro and accelerometer temperatures outside


this range. Lack of control caused sensor parameter shifts which would be


detected by the failure detection and isolation software as a sensor transient


failure.


The aircraft air conditioning system was not functioning properly in the
 

early part of the flight test program and caused ambient air temperatures to


exceed 900 F. The system was never adequate when the aircraft was sitting on


the ground and the outside air temperature exceeded 900 F Operation of the


air conditioning (which was always needed at Crows Landing) required that one


engine be running. This limited the accuracy of the calibration. The inade­

quate ground cooling system used to correct this problem caused overcooling of


some inertial components (when the cabin temperature was normal) because the


outlets of the aircraft air conditioning were exhausting cold air directly


onto these inertial components. This over-cooling caused uncompensated tem­

perature gradients in the sensors, and this triggered a transient failure
 

report from the failure detection and isolation algorithm. This condition was


corrected once the source of the problem had been isolated.


Softoare- Postflight analyses indicated that the base motion isolation


software mechanization did not perform as well as expected and was the cause


of excessive errors during fine-alignment
 

Using computed body velocity at the end of each 1-sec navigation update


to approximate the average velocity over that update caused acceleration


induced position errors as large as 52 m (170 ft) for 1800 turns. These 
averaged to zero for straight line acceleration and deceleration. (Volume III 
discusses this error in detail.) 
The statistical failure detection and isolation algorithm threshold limm­

its were specified to be one and a half times the standard deviation of the


gyro error derived from the laboratory test environment. Flight test exper­

ience showed that the gyro errors were greatly increased as compared to the


laboratory dynamic test data. The original limits were 0.060 /hr for static


conditions and a maximum dynamic increase of 0.12 0/hr to give a maximum thresh­

old of 0.18°/hr These were changed to 0.480 /hr (static) with a 0.960 /hr


maximum dynamic increase to give a maximum threshold of 1.540 /hr. These
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increases were derived more intuitively than analytically and proved to be


inadequate as evidenced by the large number of "false" failures. The software


was then modified to remove the statistical failure detection, isolation,


classification, and recompensation algorithm in the navigation and flight


modes (after Flight 7). The failure detection software was then totally


dependent upon the total squared error algorithm.


The total squared error algorithm failure detection thresholds (maximum


allowable squared error) were initially determined on the basis of laboratory


tests without compensation for aircraft dynamics. The total squared error


threshold was both mission and environment sensitive. The initial gyro total


squared error maximum allowable squared error was (0.760/hr)2 with a maximum


dynamic increase of (0.810/hr)2 to produce a maximum threshold of (l.57°/hr)2 .


Early flight test data indicated false gyro "failures" were being triggered


during aircraft turn maneuvers because these limits were low. The limits were


raised to (1.140/hr)2 (static) and (1.980/hr)2 for maximum dynamic increase


giving a maximum threshold of (3.120/hr)2 . Also, the accelerometers,


initially set at (0.4 cm/sec)2 for first fail maximum allowable squared error


and (0.13 cm/sec)2 for second fail maximum allowable squared error, were reset


to (0.28)2 and (0.25 cm/sec)2 , respectively. These changes removed the false


failure indications during aircraft maneuvers.


In summary, the tests showed that the failure detection software worked,


but not well. The greatest improvement could be 6btained by better dynamic


modeling of the operating environment and its effect on normal sensor output.


LABORATORY EVALUATION OF THE DUAL COMPUTER SYSTEM


The SIRU dual computer system was analyzed at the Stanford University


Digital Systems Laboratory. Emphasis was placed upon reliability and com­

pleteness of fault detection. In this chapter, some considerations are first


presented relative to assessing computer-system reliability. An analysis of


the dual redundant system's selftest effectiveness, arbiter function perfor­

mance, and preflight testing abilities are then discussed. This is followed


by a description of suggested changes which would improve the overall relia­

bility of a future system.


Basic Design Considerations


In order to evaluate SIRU's reliability, some definitions first had to be


established. In n-modular redundant computer systems, a voter module decides


the correct final output based on all the information from the redundant


modules. If the voter is nonfaulty, then the final output would be correct


,even though some of the redundant modules could be faulty.


In the SIRU implementation, there was no hardware voter; instead, there


existed an arbiter which formed an educated guess as to which (if any) of the


two computers was faulty. The arbiter used error detection techniques which
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did not inspect the actual output data. There was no switching of data as in


a hardware voter The human operator observed both the output displays and


the arbiter opinion Thus, the "voter" for the SIRU system was actually the


operator, despite the automatic prime select mode.


For the purpose of this evaluation, it was decided to assume that the


arbiter acted like an n-modular redundant voter unit (i.e., as if the arbiter


output controlled a fault-free switch, gating only one of the two data outputs
 

to a single display). A system failure occurred when incorrect output data


was selected as correct by the arbiter. This allowed the results to be more


directly compared to other simplex and n-modular redundant systems.


The basic design philosophy of the SIRU computer system appeared to be a


sound one. A dual computer configuration was an effective way to achieve an


increase in reliability because efficient usage was made of hardware resources.


For example, in a triplicated system with voters, system failure occurs when


two or more channels have failed. Thus, one good channel may still exist but


cannot be used unless the system is able to degrade to the simplex configura­

tion after the second failure. On the other hand, in a dual configuration


with an arbiter, system failure could occur only when both modules have failed;


all modules are used


A dual computer system should be designed so that one failure will not


fail the entire function. This implies the presence of not only good error


detection, but also a high degree of isolation between the two channels so


that errors will not propagate from the faulty computer to the good one. The


SIRU computer system achieved very effective electrical isolation between the


various modules by using opto-isolators at all points of physical contact


This assured that a fault in one module had almost zero probability of


adversely affecting any other module.


The propagation of error through data and flag signals also had to be


considered. The method proposed by Ressler (ref. 8) of transferring data


between the two computers ensured that the nonfaulty computer would never


receive contaminated data when only one fault had occurred in the system. It


was not possible for the faulty computer to "lock-up" or halt the nonfaulty


computer. Because status data were only received through a self-request, the


nonfaulty computer would never accept bad data from the other computer.
 

In order to use both computers, the arbiter had to be able to decide


which (if either) of the two computers was faulty. Due to the complicated


and extensive error-detection facilities built into the system, the arbiter


was sure to make a correct decision, given the occurrence of a single perma­

nent fault. Here, "single fault" refers to the more mundane and expected
 

mechanical and electrical faults.


It is always possible, when analyzing a dual system such as the SIRU


design, to postulate some unusual fault consisting of multiple changes or


events and to demonstrate that the arbiter would make an incorrect choice in


that situation. Discussing such events is meaningless unless the probability


of their occurrence is significant with respect to more simple faults. In the


35


case of the SIRU, the large number of components in both the computers and the


error-detection circuitry increased the failure rate for the system as a whole.
 

Thus, a complete evaluation of the system included aspects concerned with


multiple faults, such as recovery and arbiter functions. The SIRU system was


clearly not secure from failure due to a conjunction of two or more simple


faults.


Self-Test Routines


The SIRU computer system was designed to reduce the probability that one


fault would fail the mission, this would happen if one computer failed and the


arbiter made an incorrect decision. To evaluate the SIRU dual computer system,


a class of faults to be detected by SIRU had to be specified. This fault set


was a function of how the various subsystems were implemented in hardware.


(For example, the fault set for a standard core memory might not be suited to


the type of error detection required for a semiconductor memory. Therefore,


statements about the SIRU hardware systems might not apply to alternate hard­

ware implementations of the SIRU system.)


The Honeywell 316 computers used in the SIRU flight test readiness system


had central processors built almost completely with NAND gates on small-scale


integration chips. The memories had 12K 16-bit words of core almost entirely
 

taken up by navigation programs, and did not use parity checking. The self­

diagnosis for each processor consisted of reading its own data word from the


T-box register, executing a series of instructions meant to test the control


logic and data paths, and computing checksums on those portions of memory


whose contents should not change. There was a significant probability that


the software self-tests would never detect a computer failure because the fault


would not allow correct execution of the self-test programs.


Figure 36 depicts the SIRU processing cycle in which each computer passed


through states A, B, C, D, E between each SIRU interrupt. For a real fault,


the program flow would be different. For example, if the program-counter


clock line was stuck at 1, the program would repeatedly execute the same


instruction as long as the fault was active After the fault became inactive,


the self-tests would be positive, and the cross-checking would be negative,


even though the output data would be incorrect as illustrated in figure 37.


The self-test program would not find this type of error because when it was


finally executed, the fault would no longer exist.


Clearly, if the fault set to be detected were the set of all single

"stuck-at" faults on the pinouts of the small-scale integration chips or on


address and data bus lines, then the self-test programs would not be effective


diagnostic tools because of the anomaly which could occur due to a transient


fault. These diagnostics were executed only once for every SIRU interrupt


cycle. The rest of the time, about 12K words of navigation programs were


being executed. Thus, between the time that a fault occurred and the time


when the diagnostics should be executed, the memory and central processor unit


were being exercised with a very wide variety of instruction types, addresses,


data and test conditions.
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If a single stuck-at fault existed in memory, it would more likely be the


fault of an address decoder or a single bit of data. The fault would affect


memory references over a large number of addresses and perhaps the entire


address space


There was a small probability that a fault which would allow the program


to progress through all the navigation software to the entry point of the test


routine would occur causing the diagnostic routines to execute correctly to


completion and to send the correct result to the T-box. A more realistic


assumption would be that the program counter would randomly skip through


memory until a "steady-state" would be reached in which control continuously


loops through a set of random memory locations.


In the SIRU system where both instructions and data were in unprotected


memory, the loss of control due to a simple memory fault could result in the


destruction of program areas including the sections reserved for self­

diagnosis, cross-diagnosis, interprocessor communication and recovery soft­

ware. For fault detection only, as is the case in the SIRU software, the


destruction of kernel software would be desirable because the arbiter then has


more definite indications of a failure in that processor


An important observation made of the SIRU)system which applies to recon­

figurable systems was that damage to software from hardware faults should be


limited so that only navigation status locations need be transferred during


recovery Also, a high probability should exist that all recovery software


remain intact. For this reason, it would be better to implement the fixed


program memory in an operational SIRU derivative computer system using read­

only memories and a random-access memory (read/write) for all temporary and


status locations.


A similar problem existed with simple stuck-at faults occurring in the


main registers, the instruction decoder, and the arithmetic and logic unit.


The Honeywell 316 used the same gates and data paths for both the program


counter modification and all accumulator operations Thus, any fault which


would cause errors in the data calculations would likely affect the program


counter in the same way (This problem would apply even more to current


microprocessors in which the program counter and assorted address registers


are in the same physical loop and use the same arithmetic units as all the


accumulators.) The program execution of diagnostic software which would test


the required circuitry would very often not take place. Redesigning the sys­

tem to have more independent subunits might alleviate this problem, as long as


the number of components is kept within the bounds imposed by power, space,


cost and total failure rate


This evaluation makes clear the problems of using stored-program self­

diagnostics in a typical minicomputer or microprocessor.
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-Arbiter Function


Because there are so many components in both the SIRU computers and the


transmission channel, it was necessary to consider the behavior of the arbiter


when the system had multiple faults. In actual operationk many faults would­

be transient so the manner in which the arbiter "remembers" previous error


detection would be very iiportant. In the SIRU flight test system, all the


error detection bits feeding the prime-select circuitry were not latched from


cycle to cycle. The error detectors all fed the "A-Fail," "B-Fail," and


"system-Fail" latches, which did not affect the prime-select circuitry and


could only be reset by the operator. The cross-opinion bits were displayed to


the operator; they were not latched between cycles and did not affect the


prime-select. The operator could manually select which computer was to be


prime.


In certain situations, the operator had to supplement the action of the


arbiter to form the optimal system response to the situation. For example,


suppose computer A had an internal transient fault which contaminated its


status data and recovery was not implemented. The operator would observe the


"A-Fail," and both disagreement indicators would light up. It would be pos­

sible that the transient fault was of short enough duration that the changes


at the panel were not observed until after the fault became inactive If the


operator did not switch prime manually to B, then a future transient error in


the B transmission channel or error detector could cause the arbiter to choose


A as prime, and thus the system would fail. If the operator switched prime to


B manually, then the system could only fail when a fault occurred in the B


computer, or a permanent fault occurred in the B transmission channel.


On the other hand, suppose that a transient error occurred in the A trans­
mission channel. Now the operator would observe the "A-Fail" indicator lit, 
but there would be no disagreement between the two computers. In this case, 
the operator should only reset the "A-Fail" light, and should not switch to 
B manually, because the A channel would still be providing correct data, and 
it would decrease the reliability not to use it after that time. It would be 
important that the operator reset the "A-Fail" light, because otherwise he 
would not be able to distinguish later between a transient failure in the 
A computer (as described above) and a loss of communication between the two 
processors without wasting valuable time to visually compare the displays. A 
loss of communication between the processors would appear as both computers 
indicating disagreement. However, neither would have latched the fail indi­
cator. If recovery were implemented and good status data successfully 
restored to a failed computer, the arbiter panel would appear the same as it 
would in the case of an intermittent transmission channel fault. 
It would be useful to automatically reset the fail indicators when both 
cross-opinion bits show agreement so that the operator did not have to decide 
when a failed channel or computer had recovered. It would also be useful to 
use the "A-Fail" and "B-Fail" latch outputs as additional inputs to the prime 
select in anticipation of the manual selection by the operator. The operator 
should retain a complete set of manual override controls so that faults aris­
ing in the arbiter, error detectors, and inter-computer communications would 
not fail the computer system. 
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The T-box register was well designed so that it was not possible for a


single fault to send incorrect data to both the other computer and the display


while sending correct data back to the same processor when it tested its


input/output. Thus, the operator would always be able to distinguish an inter­

mittent channel fault from errors caused by incorrect status words within the


computer by observing the opinion bits (as long as at least one complete com­

puter and channel would be operational and correct).


Preflight System Testing


One problem associated with SIRU's extensive computer error detection was


the inability to adequately test it during preflight maintenance. The central


arbiter circuitry could be tested if the error detectors which send data to it


could be manipulated so as to provide a complete set of arbiter inputs. This


was not possible unless all the error detection circuitry would be fully


tested. If an error detector failed so as to incorrectly indicate an error in


the computer or channel it was checking, then preflight maintenance would


continue until the fault in the error detector was located and repaired. But


if the error detector tailed so as to constantly indicate "no error," then


normal maintenance would not reveal any faults, and the system would be


cleared for operation with a fault. Consequently, the single fault assumption


would no longer apply, and it would be possible that one more fault would fail


the mission.


It is necessary to design a future system with the ability to thoroughly


test all error detectors and the central arbiter circuitry, either by using


self-checking techniques or by exercising all components with auxiliary diag­

nostic equipment. This was possible in the SIRU implementation for the


watchword checker, the self-diagnostics, and the computer time-out generator.


It was not possible for the parity generation, bit counts, and clock active


signals. Table 11 summarizes the testable and untestable SIRU subsystems.


A practical problem related to the SIPU computer system was the large


number of one-shot multivibrators employed for both time-out checking and


clock generation. These devices are inherently less stable than crystal


generators. Using such a large number of these devices significantly


increases the probability of a timing failure. The problem of testing the


multavibrators for time delay drift was also very acute, particularly since


the existing system had no facility to inject specific signals to the one-shot


inputs and directly observe their outputs. Some testing could be done if it


were possible to dynamically change the behavior of parts of the circuitry


which were being checked by the one-shots.


The method of testing depends partly on the available inputs and outputs


of the system. Because the correct operation of each error-detection device


must be verified, the direct output of each device should be available either


as a panel light or as an outlet to a maintenance jack. If the signals from


several error-detection devices are merged into one "fail" signal and are not


available separately, then the tests must be designed to activate only one


error detector at a time, so that the result would not be masked by other
 

values.
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The SIRD flight test system was designed in such a way that the parity


checker, the bit count and the clock-active error detectors could not be


adequately tested. The parity checker could be tested if an auxiliary input


from the maintenance equipment were exclusively ORed with the output of the
 

parity generator in each T-box. The test software would have to change each


bit input one at a- ime -to exercise both parity trees, and the extra input


would exercise the final output of the receiver parity checker.


If each T-box and receiver had a single crystal-controlled clock instead


of numerous one-shot multivibrators, the system would be much-easier to test.


Dynamic tests would be required only for the single clock output, rather than


the inputs and outputs of each one-shot. The clock would feed a set of simple


one-chip sequential machines which could be tested at a functional level only.


Therefore, they would not require a variety of difficult time delay tests.


Another way to test these error detectors would be to vary incrementally


the time delays of the circuits being checked and to measure the "error


qlindow" detected by the error detector For example, the computer could send 
opinions to the time-out generator of the T-box at a variety of different time 
delays from the SIRU interrupt. The auxiliary test equipment would record the 
time-out error indicator at the arbiter to know what range of time delay was 
being marked as erroneous. This would be the best method if it could be 
implemented. However, the SIRU design did not allow easy incremental change 
of any time delay except that of the computer outputs. Also, there was the 
problem of not being able to gauge the incremental time delays correctly with­
out disconnecting a large part of the circuit under test. 
Another possibility would be to use self-testing error detectors as


described in reference 9. This could only apply to the strictly combinational


error detectors such as the parity generators.


Reliability Improvements


The design of the SIRU dual computer system was basically a good one from


the standpoint of both correctness and reliability. Its strong points were


the intermodule isolation, the intercomputer communication protocol, the wide


variety of error detectors, and the effectiveness of the arbiter function.
 

The SIRU computer arrangement also had several weak points which did not affect


the normal operation of the system, but do suggest design improvements which


could improve the overall reliability and maintainability of a future system.


These include improvements in the preflight test facilities, an extension of


the arbiter function, self-tests as applied to failure recovery, the computer


software structures, and the use of different hardware components.


Computer faZlure recovery- The question of computer recovery after a


transient fault is an important one because the aircraft environment causes


many intermittent failures due to gusts, mechanical shock, vibration, radio


interference, heat gradients, and power failures. If the duration of tran­

sient faults is small compared to the mean time between faults, then an


effective recovery process can greatly improve the system reliability.
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In order for the recovery process to work properly, there must be no


fault in the recovering computer, the computer must know that it needs to


recover, and it must be able to communicate with a correct computer. If read­

only memories were used, then the absence of a fault would imply that the
 

recovery software was intact. The communication protocol proposed in refer­

ence 8 would allow the transfer of state information from the correct to the


incorrect computer. Here the status transfer would be just an extension of


the cross-checking procedure, and very little overhead would be required in


software to implement recovery. Again, if the programs were stored in read­

only memories, only a small number of words need to be transferred.


The major difficulty in the proposed method of recovery would be that the


computer would probably never know when it is faulty or when it has incorrect


status words. As explained earlier, most actual faults would not allow the


correct execution of self-diagnostics or recovery software, so that while the


fault was active, the computer would act in a random fashion. When the fault


becomes inactive, the self-tests would have no fault to find even though the


status data were contaminated, and the computer would continue its normal pro­

cessing cycle never realizing that it should attempt recovery.


If each computer can detect its own failures, then the system reliability


would increase. There are several ways to accomplish this without relying


on special software or extensive additions to the hardware. The arbiter out­

put could be sent back to the processors, perhaps through triply modular


redundant transmission channels, indicating the cross opinions and the latch


"A-Fail," "B-Fail" signals. This would not be an ideal solution because the


arbiter could always distinguish between faults in the computer and faults in


the transmission channel Thus, a correct computer with an intermittently bad


channel might load status words from a normally operating computer which has


incorrect navigation data, thereby causing a system failure.


A better solution would be to have hardware detection at each computer.


One possibility would be to use self-checking processors similar to those dis­

cussed by Wakerly (ref. 9), which could achieve a high degree of error detec­

tion with only a 30% increase of hardware. Such a processor would supply data


to the transmission channel in a form already suitable for use by error­

detecting codes. It would have the added advantage of using state-of-the-art


large-scale integration technology to make the system more compact and


reliable.


A more efficient method would use the fact that error detection need not


be immediate and, therefore, could wait until the fault causes abnormal opera­

tion at some point in the program before the opinions were sent to the T-box.


If the fault would not allow the diagnostics to execute, then the timeout


generator in the T-box would probably be set to indicate an error. If the


timeout flag were reset only by a signal of data agreement from the other com­

puter, then the faulty computer could read its own flag (after its transient


fault becomes inactive). The faulted computer would know that it should


attempt recovery as long as the other computer says it has incorrect output.


Because each computer could only reset (and not set) the flag of the other


computer, a faulty computer could never force a nonfaulty computer to accept
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its incorrect status words. This minimum hardware solution complements any


software diagnostics by making use of the excellent error detection already


built into the SIRU system.


Software structure- The software supplied with the SIRU flight test sys­

tem-was adequate in the sense that it seemed to work correctly. All programs


were written in Honeywell 316 assembler language and assembled by the standard


Honeywell software.


Despite the fact that all the programs were probably correct (no errors


were found), it is not unreasonable to assume that errors exist in a program


which has not been proven correct. This would especially apply to programs


such as the SIRU navigation software because the involved mathematical rou­

tines could not be tested by applying all possible inputs and comparing the


outputs with known correct values. Unexpected situations could occur when a


particular combination of input values corresponds to a singularity in the


formulae being manipulated. This would cause the same incorrect result in


both computers. Proving the correctness of the software would guarantee that


the dual computer system reliability was not a function of the inputs to each


computer.


There are many studies (ref. 10) which deal with the details of proving


programs correct. The task would be simplified by using a higher level


language with block structures and preferably without "GOTO's." The program


would be proven correct and then compiled with a compiler which has been


proved correct. Although this degree of proof is admittedly not possible with


the state-of-the-art software engineering, an evaluation of the SIRU system


reliability would not be complete without its consideration.


Component seleetton- Since failure rates are proportional to the total


number of components in the system, it is important to use as few components


as possible. This policy always involves a tradeoff between the failure rate


and the effect of a single failure, as discussed previously. In the SIRU sys­

tem, the effect of a fault within the processor had no great significance if


recovery were not implemented. The computer would always continue with incor­

rect status data, and every fault would completely fail that processor.


Because recovery could occur while a fault existed and abnormal operation of


the processor could be detected by the processor itself, then the effect of an


active fault was not significant when recovery was implemented. This assumes


that all the recovery software was stored in read-only memories.


It is, therefore, feasible to use large-scale integration components in


the future design of a SIRU derivative system. The use of microprocessors


instead of an off-the-shelf computer would significantly decrease the overall


cost, space, power, weight and failure rate of the system, but would probably


limit the speed and accuracy of computation. The number of bits required for


high accuracy could be obtained by using a byte-sliced chip organization at


the cost of less speed.


As the failure rate of the processor is reduced, the number of components


in the transmission channel and arbiter circuitry have a more significant
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effect on the system failure rate. At some point, it would increase the relia­

bility to use a triplicated or n-modular redundant configuration with a much


smaller degree of error detection and arbitration The arbiter itself could


be implemented with a microprocessor so that it could more intelligently


analyze fewer inputs. The arbiter could be triplicated to reduce the proba­

bility of single-point failure (ref. 8). The current large-scale integration


technology makes such architectures desirable from the standpoint of reliabil­

ity. Various methods for fault-tolerant synchronization of n-modular redun­

dant microprocessors and methods of selective voting to achieve higher relia­

bility are discussed in reference 9.


The SIRU flight test system had a direct data line from the sensors to


the computers and a complex error-checked transmission line from the computers


to the operator display and arbiter. If large-scale integration components


were used in much of the system, the processors would be small enough to be


placed at the display instead of at the sensors, thus eliminating the need for


the transmission line between the processor and the arbiter. The arbiter


would not have to be concerned with transmission channel errors.


Unfortunately, this type of design introduces other serious problems.
 

Assuming the sensors could be located at the display, dual transmission lines


would be required from the sensors to the computers. If the computer received


erroneous data, then the navigation status of the computer would be incorrect


until it could recover nonfaulty data from the other computer. If the com­

puters were at the sensors, then a transmission channel fault would not affect


the status, and if a transient fault became inactive, the display would con­

tinue to receive accurate data. Thus, if the computers were located at the


display and if one computer were incorrect, a fault in the channel of the
 

other computer would cause it to fail. The fault would not fail the other


computer if they were located at the sensor. Consequently, it appears that


this aspect of the design should not be changed in a future SIRU-derivative


navigation system which uses large-scale integration components.


CONCLUDING REMARKS


The principal objectives of the SIRU flight test program were to make the


following assessments:
 

1. Determine SIRU's basic performance as a skewed-sensor free-inertial


navigation system as evidenced by the navigational accuracy achieved during


the flight test.


2. Determine the capability of the SIRU failure detection and isolation


algorithms to detect and isolate sensor failures


3. Judge the operating performance of the SIRU parallel dual redundant


computer configuration and its compatibility with the hexad sensor


arrangement.
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Conclusions made from the program test results as applied to each of these


objectives follow.


Navigation System Performance


Test results showed that the SIRU inertial system drift accuracy is


1-3 n. mi /hr, which is generally acceptable for short-haul aircraft opera­

tions. Navigation performance during terminal area maneuvers (including


degradation in the presence of scheduled and unscheduled failures) produced


higher error buildup. However, even without preflight calibration, these


error rates did not exceed 5 n. mi./hr. In summary, it was demonstrated that


a system like SIRU can provide the inertial navigation capability necessary


for short-haul applications. However, additional analysis, aircraft opera­

tions, oriented software design, and further testing are required to minimize


dynamic errors resulting from uncompensated instrument msalignments and scale


factor errors. Inertial sensors with long term calibration stability are


essential for strapdown applications to short haul aircraft systems


SIRU's potential for providing inertially smoothed radio navigation (i.e.,


,aided-inertial navigation) indicated that a DME/baro/inertial system based on


SIRU could easily maintain a navigation accuracy of a few hundred meters. For


one flight, the maximum aided-inertial RSS position error was about


400 m (0.2 n. mi.) compared to a free-inertial maximum error of 3 7 n. mi.


on the same flight.


The SIRU gyro resolution was 44 arcsec/bit (0.0002 rad/bit), and the


accelerometer resolution was 0.04 m/sec/bit. Data analysis showed that the


quantization-derived digital noise from the 44-arcsec/bit resolution (without


filtering software) would prohibit use of such data in short haul flight con­

trol systems. Also, SIRU's gyro measurement capacity of 1 rad/sec full-scale


is too low for many flight control applications. Scale changing to achieve


higher full scale without increasing the word length would increase the quan­

tization error. Thus, substantial modification to both hardware and software


of the SIRU would be required to meet flight control sensing requirements.


Failure Detection and Isolation Algorithm Performance


The SIRU flight experiments showed that achieving a 0.10 /hr failure


detection and isolation level is more difficult than originally projected for


aircraft operations. The failure detection and isolation algorithms were not


able to detect gyro failures smaller than l.-0 /hr because the detection


threshold-had to be adjusted to a higher value to avoid false alarms. This


threshold was a factor of -20 times larger than the drift errors detected in


the laboratory environment. This practical threshold determined in flight


indicated that the existing SIRU system can detect and isolate only "hard


faildres" (i.e., hard from an inertial navigation point-of-view). However,


this detection level,is adequate for providing redundant operations for flight


control purposes.
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The analysis of the flight results was directed towards comparing the


experimentally measured failure isolation time with the theoretical isolation


time. This comparison is related to the increase in digital system noise


derived from motion dynamics. Its assessment provides technical insight for


assessing other redundancy management strategies for short-haul avionics.


These analyses have shown that the existing SIRU hardware and software,


which was designed as a post-Apollo advanced navigation system, has a number


of limitations in short-haul applications. The results point to areas where


additional design and verification effort are required before a redundant


strapdown system could be considered for operational usage. The fault detec­

tion and isolation capability is the area in need of the most work if the SIRU


concepts are to become applicable for short-haul aircraft. Other fault


detection and isolation concepts need to be studied and compared to the SIRU


system's redundancy management scheme, which is based upon the use of the


parity residual.


Dual Computer System Reliability


The design of the SIRU dual computer system was basically a good one from


the standpoints of both correctness and reliability. Its strong points were


the intermodule isolation, the intercomputer communication protocol, the wide


variety of error detectors, and the effectiveness of the arbiter function.


The SIRU computer arrangement also had several weak points which did not affect


the normal operation of the system, but do suggest design improvements which


could improve the overall reliability and maintainability of a future operating


system. These include the self-tests as applied to failure recovery, the com­

puter software structures, the preflight test facilities, the use of different


hardware components, and an extension of the arbiter function.


The major difficulty with the SIRU method of failure recovery is that the


computer would probably never know that it has incorrect status words as a


result of an intermittent fault When a fault is active, the computer would


act in a random fashion. Most faults would not allow correct execution of 
self-diagnostics or recovery software. When the fault becomes inactive, there


is no fault to find, and the computer would continue without realizing that it


should attempt recovery.
 

The SIRU software was adequate in the sense that it seemed to work cor­

rectly for a single failure. However, it is reasonable to assume that imper­

fect algorithms exist in all computer programs. This would especially apply


to complex programs such as the SIRU software because of its involved mathe­

matical routines which cannot be tested by applying all possible inputs and


comparing the outputs with known correct values in a finite time period For


example, the SIRU preflight test system was designed in such a way that the


parity checker, the bit count, and the clock-active error detectors could not


be adequately tested. (Details of the need for preflight testing ability and


how system improvements could be made are discussed in the previous chapter.)


An imperfect calculation could be interpreted as a single failure which would


be indistinguishable from an actual failure. However, a hardware failure
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would probably cause multiple computer failures which could not be traced to


the failed computer by the arbiter.


For a very simple computer system, the SIRU arbiter concept might be 
satisfactory, but its suitability for the redundant computational_problem of­
-
the -SIRU-system-is doubtful. 
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TABLE 1.- INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS FOR


SPACE-CRAFT AND AIRCRAFT APPLICATION


Physical

characteristic 
 Apollo 
 
Length of operation 
 Weeks 
 
Number of operations 
 Once without cooldown 
 
or power down

Preflight 
 Unlimited time in quiet 
 
calibration 
 environment 
 
Flight dynamics 
 1-D, straight line; 
 
relatively low vibration 
 
Thermal environment 
 Space radiator, stable,

700 F 
 
CV-340


One to four hours


Repeated on and off


Hurried in nonquiet


environment


3-D, maneuvering;


high vibration
 

Aircraft ambient air­

1100 F; cabin temper­

ature: 40-88 F
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TABLE 2.- DME STATION LOCATIONS FOR SIRU FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM
 

DME Lat, Long, Alt, Freq, Range, Bearing, Acq-alt,


name deg deg ft Hz n. mi. deg ft


90. 108.4 14.70 19.08 242.0
 
Portervilie 35.91 -11i9.02 500. 109.2 135.12 121.04 15772.6


Crows Landing 37.40 -121.11 170. 110.2 .45 -158.43 -28.8


Woodside 37.39 -122.28 2270. 111.4 56.11 -101.01 651.3


San Francisco 37.61 -122.37 
 
Modesto 37.62 -120.95 
 
10. 111.6 61.68 -88.16 3490.8


Los Banos 36.71 -120.77 2107. 112.6 44.72 149.07 -199.4


Fresno 36.88 -119.80 100. 112.9 70.08 106.27 4379.0


San Jose 37.36 -121.92 48. 114.1 39.42 -104.09 1465.4


Linden 38.07 -121.00 260. 114.8 39.95 -2.98 1290.5


Sacramento 38.44 -121.55 5. 115.2 65.26 -28.78 3897.3


-119.09 550. 115.4 151.18 129.21 19788.4
Bakersfield 35.48 

Frxant 37.10 -119.59 2380. 115.6 74.81 93.77 2703.6


Stockton -37.83 -121.17 40. 116.0 25.37 -16.89 669.5


Gorman 34.80 -118.86 4500. 116.1 190.87 134.36 27849.8


Oakland 37.72 -122.22 30. 116.8 56.42 -80.36 2922.1


Avenal 35.64 -119.97 710. 117.1 119.13 142.26 11969.1


Salinas 36.66 -121.60 77. 117.8 50.83 -162.05 2346.0


Fellows 35.09 -119.85 5000. 117.5 151.77 145.98 15496.2


Moffett Field 37.43 -122.05 4. 117.6 45.39 -98.36 1956.9
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TABLE 3a.- MOFFETT FIELD POSITION BENCHMARKS
 

Benchmark Latitude Longitude Elevation


A 370 24' 57" 1220 03' 17" 13.31 ft


B 370 24' 56" 1220 03' 20" 13,80 ft


C 370 24' 58" 1220 03' 25" 41.70 ft


D 370 24' 58" 1220 03' 22" 13.45 ft


TABLE 3b.- CROWS LANDING POSITION BENCHMARKS


Benchmark Latitude Longitude Elevation


AP 370 24' 48" 1210 06' 26" 141.05 ft 
L 370 24' 47" 1210 06' 17" 138.53 ft 
R 370 24' 04" 1210 06' 36" 164.71 ft 
MTR 370 25' 06" 1210 06' 11" 129.59 ft 
N 370 25' 30" 1210 06' 17" 127.46 ft 
P 370 25' 22" 1210 06' 19" 129.43 ft 
M 370 24' 55" 1210 06' 16" 134.97 ft 
TTR 370 25' 03" 1210 06' 08" 129.87 ft 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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TABLE 4 - FLIGHT TEST SUMMARY 
Navigation Flight Radar 
 Maximum Detected failures


data Route duration, duration, intersection, Marks Computers Rate position error, Unscheduled Scheduled


see see sec n mi (a) (a)


5/20 Moffett/Crows 
 5170 2230 1655 6 B L 5 93 G(CF), 
--
5/30A Moffett/Crows 2380 1285 0 9 B H 12 82 G(FCBDEA), --
A(A) 
5/30B Crows/Los Banos/Moffett 5980 4390 2295 23 B H,L 
 41 02 G(EFABCD) --
6/16A Moffett/Crows 3074 1608 0 11 A=B L 23 08 G(FCEABD), 
--
A(A) I 
6/16B Crows/Moffett 2321 1670 0 8 A=B L 3 55 	 G(ABFGED),

A(E)I 
6/18 Moffett/Sac /Moffett 15303 14185 0 30 A 
 L 	 33 99 G(EACBF), _-
A(D)


6/25 Crows/Crows 	 3405 2450 3282 
 10 A=B H 12 94 G(CDEA)A(D) 
-­
7/14 Moffett/Stockton/Moffett 6005 4323 0 11 B H - 35 59 G(BDACF) ' --
7/17A Moffett/Stockton 5956 4000 1020 14 A=B H 4 40 
7/17B Stockton/Moffett 4155 3925 3085 12 A H 2 10 -- G(CA) 
7/24A Moffett/Crows 2400 1295 354 6 A=B H 2 79 _, 
7/24B Crows/Stockton/Crows 2555 2163 2447 5 A=B H 1 23 -- A(CE)
7/24C Crows/Stockton/Crows 2587 2241 2417 
 6 A#B H 4 04 -- A(CA),A(C) 
7/29A Moffett/Stockton/Crows 3971 3439 3174 9 AfB H 14 06 G(FBD) G(CD


7/29B Crows/Moffett 
 2426 1392 1469 8 A#B H 7 13 G(E) G(C)


8/22A Moffett/Crows 2630 1181 553 
 7 A=B H 2 93 
--
8/22B Crows/Crows 2110 646 2038 6 AB H 36c G(E),A(L) G(AB)
8/22C Crows/Bakersfield 4082 
 3422 2566 5 AOB VH,L 11 16 G(EF),A(E) G(AB)

8/22D Bakersfield/Moffett 
-- 4320 -- 6 
 A H -- G(E),A(A) --

8/29A Moffett/Crows 2620 1202 
 850 6 A=B H 7 65 -- G(BA) 
3c
8/293 Crows/Crows/Crows 2501 553 2316 
 5 A#B H -- G(BA) 
9/05A Moffett/Crows 2200 1231 0 6 A#B H 2 50 G(A) G(FE)
C 	 9/05B Crows/Crows 3067 1990 1774 2 A#B H 3 72 G(F) A(BA)
9/05C Crows/Crows 2331 1498 1404 2 A#B H 1 86 G(F) G(E)

F 9/05D Crows/Moffett 2053 1369 1497 
 6 A#B H 3 00 G(EF) A(DC) 
9/10A Moffett/Crows 3750 2467 1758 4 A=B H 3 97 ....


C9/10B Crows/Crows(A cont'd) 
 2527 1794 2365 5 A=B H 10 19 G(B) 
--
9/10C Crows/Crows(B cont'd) 
 2652 1952 459 6 A=B H 19 36 ....
9/10D Crows/Moffett(C cont'd) 1859 1187 0 4 A=B H 
 20 14 ....


" . 9/18A Moffett/Crows 3860 
 2890 2173 4 A=B H 6 22 
 ....


9/18B Crows/Crows(A cont'd) 3045 2415 3045 5 A=B H 
 7 62 .... 
9/18C Crows/Crows(B cont'd) 2690 2467 2690 5 A=B H 6 88 .... 
9/18D Crows/Moffett 1600 1091 804 5 A=B H 2 91 G(FE),A() -­
9/24 Moffett/Baker/Moffett 15819 14293 8928 21 
 A=B L 7 8 .... 
1It should be noted that the large number of failures through most of the early flights were caused by low TSE limits and pro­
cedural problems During later flights, some unscheduled failures were detected and resolution of the cause not determined 
G(FCBDEA) indicates gyros r, C, B, D, E, and A failed in that order A(A) indicates accelerometer A failed, etc


bSmall failure undetected (below detection limit)


cPosition 	 and velocity were reset during nagivation


TABLE 5.- POSITION REFERENCE DATA


Residual 
 Residual Residual 
radar-
 DME­ radar­
photograph 
 photograph DME 
Test 
flt.no. Mo. Day Mark no. R-M 
 D-M R-D 
Crows Landing

5 6 25 1 
 423.825 
 975.927 622.658 
5 6 25 2 
 320.361 
 550.117 604.741 
5 6 25 3 
 520.697 
 497.351 711.678 
5 6 25 4 
 361.289 
 1093.61 733'.728 
5 6 25 5 
 128.034 
 634.744 744.033 
5 6 25 7 
 54.7524 
 709.752 677.333 
5 6 25 8 
 226.632 
 656.635 776.282 
7 7 17 15 
 106.305 
 684.344 612.039 
7 7 17 17 
 122.033 
 1246.06 1278.73 
9 7 29 4 
 280.788 
 1012 775.809 
9 7 29 8 
 246.434 
 853.89 730.937 
15 9 24 2 
 613.069 
 940.726 735.407 
15 9 24 6 
 574.165 
 610.515 1053.21 
Stockton Metropolitan Airport 
7 7 17 16 439.415 327.143 760.912 
9 7 29 5 847.235 55.236 901.919 
5 9 24 5 654.978 994.773 779.891 
Modesto City-County Airport 
7 7 17 13 499.61 562.744 284.105 
9 7 29 6 439.118 507.555 372.682 
15 9 24 7 597.118 734.54 879.79 
15 9 24 15 1215.7 1576.1 362.534 
Castle Air Force Base 
7 7 17 14 368.718 209.895 567.57 
9 7 29 7 776.962 448.343 599.089 
15 9 24 8 612.854 567.516 513.086 
15 9 24 14 1004.99 2083.71 1138.42 
TABLE 6.- AVERAGE RESIDUALS BETWEEN POSITION


REFERENCES AS MEASURED DURING THE FLIGHT


Radar-photograph 
R-M 
DE-photograph 
D-M 
Radar-DME 
R-D 
Average 
residual (ft) 
476.46 722.42 717.36 
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Nav. 
 
Flight duration
se)(sec) 
5/20 - 5171 
5/30A 2380 
 
5/30B 5980 
 
6/16A' 3074 
 
6/16B 2321 
 
6/18 15303 
 
6/25 3405 
 
7/14 6005 
 
7/17A 4888 
 
7/17B 4155 
 
7/24A 2400 
 
7/24B 2555+ 
 
7/24C 2587+ 
 
7/29A 4900 
 
7/29B 2426 
 
8/22A - 2630 
8/22B 2110 
 
8/22C 4082 
 
8/22D 9 
8/29A 2620 
 
a ,- a 
8/29B 2501 
 
9/05A 2200 
 
9/05B 3067 
 
9/05C 2013 
 
9/05D 2053 
 
9/10A 3733 
 
9/10B 6685 
 
9/1OC 9620 
 
9/10D 12130 
 
9/18A 3860 
 
9/18B 7345 
 
9/18C 10700 
 
9/18D 1600 
 
9/24 15819 
 
TABLE 7.-

MaiLmum 
 
position
error 
errom 
5-93 
 
12.82 
 
41;02 
 
23.08 
 
3.55 
 
33.99 
 
12.94 
 
35.59 
 
4.40 
 
2.10' 
 
2.79 
 
1.23+ 
 
4.04+ 
 
14.06 
 
7.13 
 
2.93 
 
.36 
 
11.16 
 
?1 
 
7.65 
 
a 
.3 
 
2.50 
 
3.72 
 
1.86 
 
3t00 
 
3.97 
 
10.19 
 
19.36 
 
20.14 
 
6.22 
 
7.62 
 
6.88 
 
2.91 
 
7.80 
 
SIRU NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE


Average Average Straight line (A+ Bt)


position slope A B
error
e)(n.mir (n. um./hr) (n. mi.) (n. mi./hr) 
3.19 4.61 -0.02 4.65 
4.47 9.80 -12.31 34.56 
17.76 20.77 -6.56 26.59 
12.30 29.61 -2.95 34.73 
.81 2.70 -.15 3.06 
12.60 5.49 4.39 3.90 
7.63 15.58 1.07 13.86 
15.65 19.79 -3.77 23.27 
2.52 2.94 - .53 2.44 
1.02 1.22 .45 .77 
1.21 3.64 -.01 3.67 
.36 .97 .04 .88 
1.48 4.35 -.62 5.63 
8.53 10.50 -1.88 12.50 
1.76 6.14 -1.32 9.09 
1.38 3.94 -.24 4.44 
.31 .84 .27 .14 
2.22 4.81 -.92 6.20 
1 ? 9 
2.10 6.65 -1.48 9.71 
.15 .36 .12 .11 
1.06 3.56 -.10 3.81 
1.05 2.73 -.53 3.66 
.60 2.25 -.16 2.68 
.73 4.13 -.57 6.22 
1.19 2.36 -.20 2.65 
4.40 5.32 -1.92 6.86 
6.70 5.37 -1.66 6.29 
8.16 5.15 -.85 5.53 
2.22 4.52 -.96 5.85 
'4.00 3.85 .34 3.61 
4.33 2.59 2.03 i.57 
.95 4.79 -.54 6.61 
3.92 1.59 1.68 1.02 
aPosition reset 1300 see.
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TABLE 8.- SCHEDULED FAILURE DETECTION/ISOLATION TEST RESULTS


Unde-

Flight Flight Failed Failure Time Time tected Error,

eond(a) 	 sc detected to, Erro,
segment cgt sensor 	 level in s  dura- n,


()sec sec tion, g,6


sec


7/17B 	 SL C gyro 5/hr 807 866 59 0.0820


M A gyro 100 /hr 1267 1300 33 .0920


7/24B 	 SL C accel. 2 cm/see2 1628 1648 20 .40 m/see


SL E aceel 3 em/sec 2 2102 2123 21 .63 m/sec


7/24C 	 SL C gyro 5°/hr 1392 1443 51 .0710


SL C accel 2 cm/see 2 1599 1619 20 .40 m/sec


M,SL A gyro 30 /hr 1808 1925 117 .0970


7/29A 	 M,SL C gyro 3.50/hr 1308 1394 86 .0840


SL D gyro 3°/hr 1433 1568 135 .1120


7/29B 	 M C gyro(A) 0 50/hr 607 ... ... ...


M C gyro(B) 1.50 /hr 659 902 243 .1010


8/22B 	 SL A gyro 6167°/hr 495 495 51 (.0860, 1.70)


SL B gyro 61670 /hr 516 516 <l (.0860, 1.70)


M A gyro 61670 /hr 1664 1664 :1 (.0860, 1.7)


M B gyro 61670 /hr 1682 1682 si (.0860, 1.70)


8/29B 	 SL,M A gyro 60 /hr 675 775 100 .1670


SL B gyro 240 /hr 680 691 11 .0730


9/05A 	 SL E gyro 60 /hr 1205 1254 49 .0820


SL F gyro 240 /hr 1211 1222 11 .0730


9/05B 	 M A aceel. 1 cm/sec2 765 863 98 .98 m/see


M B accel. 4 cm/sec2 773 863 90 3.6 m/see


9/05C 	 M E gyro 60 /hr 595 645 50 .0830


9/05D 	 M C accel. I cm/sec 2 488 572 84 .84 m/sec


M D accel. 4 em/sec 2 500 572 72 2.88 m/see


aSL straight-and-level flight; M. 
 maneuvering flight.


ORIGINAL PAGE 18 
OF POOR QUAITY; 
53


TABLE 9.- SUMMARY OF UNSCHEDULED SENSING AXES FAILURES


Flight and failure identification Estimated reasons for failure


Attitude Acceler- Temper- Defective Defective Defective 

sensing ation Insuf- ature Ambient 
 Dompen­

Test axes sensing ficient gradients temper- sation sation saton Unde­

no. failures axes atures due to due to due to 

(denoted failures tim u doe in excess human cali- poor
(denoted me lowing of 8&, human bration error
by -R-) by -A-) cold air error procedure model 

5/20 D F -R­ -R­
-R­ -R-
5/20A ABCDEF A 
-R-A­ -R-A-
5/30B A C EF 
- -R­ -R­ -R-
6/16A ABC F AD 
-R­ -R-A­ -A-
6/16B ABCDEF E 
-A­ -R­ -R-A­
6/18 ABCDEF D 
-R­ -R-A­ -A­
6/25 A CDE D 
-R-A­ -R-A­ -R­
7/14 ABCD F 
-R­ -R­ -R-
7/17A 
7/17B 
7/24A 
7/24B 
7/24C 
7/29A B EF -R­
-R-
7/29B E 
-R-
8/22A 0 
8/22B E E 
-R-A­
-
8/22C F E 
-R-A-
8/22D E E -R-A­ d 
8/29 4 
9/05A A P P 
9/05B F -R- V 
9/05C F 
-R-
9/05D EF 
-R­ k 
9/10A 
9/10B H o 
9/10C H 
9/10D "4H 
9/18A " 
9/18B 
9/18C 
9/18D9/24 EF E -R-A­
TABLE 10.- TOTAL PARITY ERROR RESIDUAL


STANDARD DEVIATIONS FROM FLIGHT 14 (9/18B)


Gyro parity residuals 
Flight mode (standard deviation ( 0/hr)) 
aA aB aC aD aE aF 
30 /sec (CCW) 1.04 2.28 0.96 0.70 2.56 2.88 
30 /sec (CW) 1.24 1.99 .88 .76 1.96 Z.0 
Level flight 0.36 0.69 1.01 0.68 0.33 0.72 
TABLE 1.- SIRU COMPUTER PREFLIGHT SYSTEM TESTABILITY 
Subsystem 	 Comments


Testable:


Watchword checker Software can send various "faulty" watchwords to the


receiver to test a match for each bit, one bit at a


time.


Self-diagnostics 	 Software can continuously execute self-diagnostics,


with random interrupts from the auxiliary test equip­

ment which performs an action similar to the effects


of the fault being diagnosed.


Time-out generator 	 Software can send opinions to the T-box at various


(for computer) 	 time delays, testing the "window" of the time-out.


This can also be used to gauge the accuracy of the


time-out delay elements, but only if the clock gener­

ator of the computer is determined to be within fre­

quency bounds when tested by the auxiliary test


equipment.


Not testable:


Parity checker 	 It is possible to exercise the T-box parity tree by


changing all the input bits one at a time, but there


is no facility to change the parity bit sent to the


receiver.


Bit count 	 It is not possible to cause the T-box counter to act


in a faulty way, nor 	can the transmitted clock be


tested by circuitry other than the (perhaps faulty)


receiver counter.


Clock active 	 There is no way to incrementally vary the clock time


delays or inject various unusual pulses on the 
clock lines.
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Figure 1.- SIRU inertial component sensor assembly.
 

Figure 2.- SIRU computer console.
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OF POOR QUALM1 
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strapdown inertial reference unit 
Figure 3.- Dodecahedron SIRU instrument configuration.
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Figure 9.- Flight sequence - Moffett Field to/from Crows Landing NALF. 
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37 3 - Position from computer B 
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Figure 11.- Location of external reference equipment in the CV-340 aircraft.
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Figure 12.- Position reference locations. 
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Figure 14.- Benchmark locations at Crows Landing.
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